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Differences in the regulatory framework create specific path dependencies in per mobile market. 
Correspondingly, there is a need to assess how the mobile markets differ till now as well as the direction of 
the market evolution in the future. Therefore the systematic assessment of the mobile markets will present 
the insight of the market dynamics along with rising opportunity to make comparison between  multiple 
mobile markets.  
As a part of research methodology, we first perform theoretical review regarding the previous research on 
the analysis of mobile market structures.  We observe that most of the research focuses on either  the 
analysis of a single market parameter for multiple mobile markets or comparison of two markets for a set 
of  parameters in a qualitative or quantitative way. In contrast with above we take a systematic approach 
by taking a set of parameters for multiple mobile markets. We complete our analysis by investigating the 
market characteristics from spectrum policy and market structure point of view.  Based on the evaluation, 
we assess the state-of- art outlook of the selected mobile markets: Finland, Chile, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand, China, India, United States, Japan and Sweden.    
Based on our results, we assess that Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is the explaining factor for the spectrum 
policy. In this regards, India possesses the most decentralized  where China has the most centralized mobile 
spectrum. Market structure analysis put forward both mobile prices and investments per subscribers as the 
explaining factor for the market structure. Based on that, India is  the most open mobile market where 
Japan has the most closed mobile market structure. European markets; Finland, Sweden and U.K. have 
more open market structure than the North American mobile market.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter constitutes an introduction to our research work. To begin with, we will present our 
motivation to involve a research in this particular topic. Then, we will describe our objectives, scope and 
the research questions. After that, the research methodology that has been utilized in this study will be 
presented. Lastly, the structure of the thesis will be overviewed.  
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
In the last decade, mobile industry has achieved notably a vital share in the economy of the many countries 
[1]. Accordingly, government bodies have preferred to design tailored mobile industry regulations to 
sustain the maximum utilization from the mobile industry. Thus, tailored regulation framework and the 
market response created variant mobile market structures across the countries. Variant mobile market 
structures are created based on altered power of mobile ecosystem players. In this way, mobile markets 
may react inconsistently to a certain market parameter. In the literature, there are studies available which 
analyzes different mobile markets in respect to a certain parameter as well as comparison of two mobile 
markets for multiple parameters.  Watson et. al. has investigated the mobile telecommunications industries 
in New Zealand and Finland [2]. Also, Basaure et.al.  has analyzed mobile market structures in Chile and 
Finland [3]. Moreover, Sridhar et al. has compared Finnish and Indian market. Analysis on a certain 
parameter is widely available in the literature such as Ertunc et. al. [4] on mobile coverage and service 
quality, Kuscu et. al. [5] on regulatory framework regarding mobile network operators and mobile virtual 
network operators, Karabacak [6] on vertical separation in mobile industry. These studies constitute a great 
base for understanding inherent mobile market characteristics and  market development over time.  
 
Mobile markets are very dynamic in respect to dense of high level of technological innovation and rolling-
out of new services to satisfy user demand. Radical technological innovations in  the mobile industry have 
resulted the deployment of three different mobile generations (2G, 3G, 4G) in last twenty years.  Along 
with evolving of the technology, mobile operators have provisioned additional services to extract more 
value from the subscribers. Moreover, regulators enforce the policies which align ecosystem relations. 
Understanding the relations between market players requires continuous tracing of the market. Collecting 
both qualitative and quantitative market data give way to understand the situation of a single market. 
Based on single market reports, analyses of two markets are achievable regarding how much two markets 
correlates to each other with its dynamics.  In this research study, we have focused on put available studies 
one step forward by enabling comparisons for multiple mobile markets to extract the market situation in a 
systematic way.  
 
1.2 Objective, Scope and Research Goals 
The objective of our research is to develop a study that serves to assess the mobile market structure and 
spectrum policy along with implementing the study results to the selected mobile markets. This study will 
provide the opportunity to compare multiple mobile markets simultaneously. As a sub-objective we focus 
on creating quantitative metrics which demonstrates the present market situation and characteristics of 
mobile industry in different countries. The quantitative metrics will reflect the results of the market analysis 
in a straightforward way. Thus, utilizing this study to extract market dynamics for any mobile market will be 
achievable.  
Our work is an effort to extend the span of existing research of Smura et.al. [7] and Basaure et al. (2011). 
Smura et. al. has introduced basics of phase diagram for mobile telecom regulation. Afterwards, Basaure et 
al. has developed the phase diagram and utilized it to assess present situation of Chilean and Finnish 
mobile market as well as analyzing the development of both markets historically.  The novelty of our 
research lies on accomplishing the comparisons between multiple mobile markets via utilizing quantitative 
metrics. Additionally, our scope enables analysis for broad range of industry characteristics to comprehend 
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the regulatory framework and market dynamics.  We evaluate the industry characteristics to provide inputs 
for deciding economical, technical and regulatory frameworks required to assess the spectrum 
decentralization and industry openness.  
The research on mobile market analysis requires substantial knowledge of mobile operator business as well 
as possessing deep understanding on individual mobile markets.  Furthermore, knowledge on macro-
economic situation on the studied markets assists to understand the present situation of the mobile 
markets in particular.  
Having discussed of the objectives and scope of the research we now state the research goals which guide 
the course of our research study. Following are the research goals which we primarily focus on: 
 Development of the quantitative metrics which assess spectrum policy and mobile market structure.  
 Applying the metrics to multiple mobile markets which have been selected to reflect the broad 
range of mobile market structures.  
 
1.3 Research Methodology  
For this research, we have utilized two hand-in-hand sub-projects. In the first one, we have reviewed the 
analysis by Basaure et al. regarding  the spectrum policy and market structure. The study by  Basaure et al. 
has enabled comparisons  between Finland and Chile in a qualitative way from the regulatory decisions and 
evolving market dynamics over time. Our work in this sub-project was assessment of the extending set of 
parameters in the previous research regarding their suitability to explain dynamics of a set of mobile 
markets in a straightforward way.  In the second sub-project, we have selected mobile markets which we 
will study in this research. The criterion on selection of the studied mobile markets was reflecting different 
market structures as much as possible. In this way, the novelty of our research has proved with sustainable 
data with an adequate representation of the mobile markets. 
Based on our previous knowledge on mobile markets, we have determined eleven mobile markets that may 
represent variance in mobile market structure in respect to regulatory framework and market dynamics. 
Mobile markets we have selected in this research study are listed in Table 1.1 below. With the selection of 
these mobile markets except Africa we have covered rest of the continents. Selected mobile markets 
comprise both developed and emerging mobile markets.  
Location of the Mobile Market (Continent) Mobile Markets 
Asia India, China and Japan 
Europe Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom and Turkey 
North America United States 
South America Chile 
Oceania Australia and New Zealand 
  Table 1.1. Studied mobile markets in this research based on the geographical allocation.  
As a last step, we have combined the parameters which are analyzed with the corresponding values in the 
studied mobile markets. In this way, we have concluded the spectrum policy and mobile market structure 
analysis for each studied mobile market. Thus, the studied mobile markets have been assessed 
systematically in respect to spectrum decentralization and industry openness.  
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1.4 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as followed: In chapter 2 we have presented theoretical background utilized in the 
study, in particular phase diagram for mobile telecom regulations and its parameters. This theoretical 
review will constitute the core of the study regarding the market analysis. In chapter 3, we have illustrated 
state-of-the-art reviews for studied mobile markets. Here, we have introduced characteristics of each 
mobile market along with giving insight about the market development and regulatory framework in the 
long run. Chapter 4 is dedicated for analyzing the results of the study where we have evaluated the phase 
diagram explaining factors along with implementing it to the studied mobile markets. Finally, in chapter 5 
we draw results and conclusions by reviewing how effectively we were able to meet the objectives of this 
research study, discuss our contributions and suggest directions for future work.  
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2.       Theoretical Framework 
Until the liberalization trend, telecommunications industry was dominated by state-owned monopolies 
such as Türk Telekom in Turkey, Telia in Sweden, NTT DoCoMo in Japan. Characteristically, monopolistic 
market players practice to maximize their profit by deciding the market price even possessing power for 
price discrimination. Due to being single seller in the market, high barriers were available in the 
telecommunications industry. In 1990s, during the deployment of 2G networks, countries have open up 
their mobile markets to create competition between the mobile operators. In this way, oligopolistic market 
structures have been established. Oligopolistic market structure brings domination of the market by a few 
number of players. In an oligopoly, each player possesses any power to influence the price. In these 
markets, the products produced can be homogenous or show any differentiation being that generally, the 
competition is in the highest level of factors such as quality, customer service, loyalty or image, rather than 
to the price level. Oligopolistic market structure is observed in the industries where high barriers of entry 
exist. Thus, oligopolistic markets are common in telecommunications sector because of the high barriers of 
entry [8].   
Telecommunications markets have always been one of the regulated industries by the government 
authorities via depended or independent institutions. Economides et al. [9] explains the reasons of 
regulation that the logic of American competition law is the desired outcome of antitrust policy, and 
competition is the means of achieving it. Antitrust laws are used to guard against the restrictions on 
competition. Economic regulations are established in the markets where the market forces themselves 
cannot reach the competitive outcomes. Besides, regulations may provide assistance when economic and 
social efficiencies diverse. Moreover, regulations on technical standards or market equilibrium provide 
coordination in the market. In telecommunications industry in particular, the public objectives are 
important even though these objectives are vague. Some economics claims to increase total surplus, where 
the others declare interest on promoting innovation and growth. In this way, telecommunications industry 
creates attractiveness in total economy. Lastly, some regulations may be related to provisioning of basic 
services to all of the citizens. 
Vertical integration happens when the same company operates business in different sections of a 
production path. Davies et al.  [10] has analyzed the telecommunications industry regarding investments 
and prices in vertically open and closed industry structures.  In their analysis, they have defined the aim of 
regulation as to improve price / service ratio. In these regards, the regulator may unbundle the 
telecommunications network infrastructure or sharing of telecom´s asset infrastructure. Thus, the regulator 
facilitates price competition in the market. Thus, the regulator improves the prices of the services relative 
to the quality. On the other hand, another view is mandating improvement in the quality of the services. 
The regulator intervenes or creates a market environment to ensure the investments in 
telecommunications industry. Thus, in this way the prices of the services comparing to the quality may be 
increased from another point of view. Also, Howell et al. [11] has made investigation on vertical integration 
in telecommunications based on electricity industry reforms. In their analyses, they have shown that 
vertical separation experience in electricity sector is an example for possible results for the vertical 
integration in telecommunications industry.  The vertical separation in electricity industry has created 
benefits on competition meanwhile composing mismatches in investment horizons, entry barriers, risk 
preference and information asymmetry. The combination of the mismatches lead to thin contract markets, 
increased hold-up risk, preserve wholesales risk management incentives, and bankruptcies. Thus, the 
transaction costs becomes available, as the contractual agreements are costly in regards negotiating, 
creating, monitoring the performance of the other patty and enforcing the contracts along with taking risks 
due to the acquiring and handling information about the other party. Therefore similar direct parallel 
outcomes can be seen in telecommunications industry if the vertical separation in retail and infrastructure 
functions happen. Even the retail MVNOs may use hit-and-run tactic to be in the market for a period of 
time and then go out of market completely as the investment requirements are very minimum. Thus, the 
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profits earned from the telecommunications industry has not been utilize inside the industry which 
worsens the price / quality ratio.  
The roots of our theoretical framework rely on the studies of Smura et al. During their analysis regarding 
the future scenarios for local area access, they have performed  scenario analysis which  created to basics 
of our study. First of all, they have identified industry uncertainities for scenario planning as: industry 
structure: vertical or horizontal, competition between technology substitutes: low or increase strongly, 
spectrum policy and regulation: harmonized or liberalized, role of unlicensed spectrum: limited or 
significant, number of connected devices: grow modestly or explode, role of emerging markets in affecting 
technology choices: minimal, significant locally or significant worldwide. Then, they have processed these 
uncertainties resulting in matrix analysis. The y-axis of the scenario matrix explains the industry structure in 
terms of level of vertical integration in access and content / applications provisioning.   The vertical 
integration is defined as the provision of network access and content applications by the same company 
and sold as packages to the end customers. As a contrast in horizontal market structure, content and 
application services have been provided by different players.   
Based on the study of Smura et. al., Basaure et.al. has developed the parameters of phase diagram for 
mobile telecom regulations (Figure 1.1). Based on the left side of the diagram, oligopolies can be modeled 
by utilizing game theory approach. In the other part of the figure, where mobile industry is open and 
spectrum policy is decentralized, the Coase theorem and Schumpeterian view on innovation are useful to 
make analyzes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Phase diagram for analysis of country spectrum regulation (Basaure, 2011) 
 
The Coase theorem states that the free assignment of the resources will be optimal and the government 
intervention will only worsen the social welfare where property rights are well defined as transaction costs 
are not available between parties. In “The problem of social cost”, Coase has presented the convenience of 
market based property regime. Afterwards, he has introduced first time the idea of market based spectrum 
auctions already in 1959. After his early work, spectrum issues under Coase theorem has been analyzed by 
Guzzini et al. [12]  and Lee et al.[13]. According the Coase theorem, when the transacted services or goods 
Industry Structure Policy 
1. Low  switching costs 
SIM lock /number portability 
2. High level of Infrastructure 
Sharing 
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4. Roaming and interworking 
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3. Service/ Technology neutrality  
Open Industry 
Closed Industry 
Decentralized Spectrum 
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are diverse, the value of the transaction is increased. Based on that, enabling service-level competition may 
lead the transaction in the transmission capacity this decreases entry barriers.  
In Schumpeterian view, “creative destruction” explains how innovations happen in an industry. Schumpeter 
has supported that even though bigger companies may have more resources to invest in innovation, the 
innovation is coming from the smaller companies rather than bigger ones.  In this sense, smaller firms do 
not only benefit the price competition in the market, furthermore they boost the new service innovation 
[14] [15] [16].  
  
There are plenty of studies available related to parameters located in the phase diagram.  Aydin et al. [17] 
has analyzed the effects switching costs in the mobile telecommunications. Kokko [18] has explained the 
differences between prepaid and postpaid subscriptions via explaining the characteristics of the user base. 
Lundborg et. al. [19] has explained the effect of spectrum allocation to the market competition. 
Owczarczuk  [20] has studied churn models in prepaid mobile customers.  Similarly to our study, Nakil et al. 
[21] has tracked the development of OECD mobile markets from 1998 to 2006.  
 
In this study, we will process regression analysis between the parameters in the phase diagram to reach the 
explaining factor for spectrum decentralization and industry openness. In this way, we may find the best 
quantitative metrics that reflects the insight of the market accordingly. After that we will locate the studied 
mobile markets to the phase diagram based on selected explaining factors. 
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3. Description of Case Markets 
In this section, we have review up-to-date mobile market overview of the studied countries in respect to 
regulatory framework and market forces. After reviewing this chapter, you will acquire insight about the 
studied mobile markets. 
3.1 Finland  
As possessing the reputation for accomplishing the first GSM call in the history (1991), Finland possess top 
positions in information technology related rankings such as networked readiness (rank #3), internet and 
telephony competition (rank #1) and cellular subscriptions w/data (rank #1) [22]. Finnish mobile market 
attracts great amount of public attention due to the significant contribution of ICT industry to the national 
economy [23]. Nokia, Nokia-Siemens Networks, Tieto and Rovio can be counted among the Finnish 
companies which created international recognition and success [24] [25] [26].  
Finnish telecommunications industry is regulated by FICORA (Finnish Communication Regulatory Authority) 
based on the policy decisions taken by Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communication. Spectrum 
allocation policy is categorized in region 1 under ITU recommendations and European Commission decision 
for EU countries [27].  
Finnish regulator has issued two national GSM licenses through beauty contest in 1990. Following, Radio 
Linja (currently named as Elisa) in December 1991, Sonera in June 1992 initiated their mobile operations 
[28]. Finally Finnet-owned DNA entered to the mobile business which leaded the end of duopoly period 
(2001) along with intensified competition. Finnish regulator put the mobile market competition into priority 
by mobile industry liberalization laws (1994), EU-level liberalization standards (1998) and avoiding high 
coverage obligations for mobile operators [29]. The high motivation for establishment of a pioneer mobile 
market has continued by granting of the first 3G licenses in the world via beauty contest (March 1999). The 
licenses were issued three existing players namely; Sonera, Elisa and Finnet as well as the new market 
entrant Tele2.  Distributed 3G licenses do not comprise any particular requirement for mobile operators 
besides permitting the regulator for the market intervention right in case of efficient spectrum usage 
violation. In this sense, Tele2´s license have been revoked in June 2005 by the regulator [30]. Thus, 
experiment of the new-entrant to the market via 3G licensing has been failed. In 2009, FICORA has 
abandoned beauty contest method which is its traditional spectrum granting strategy along with favoring 
market-based spectrum assignment methods. Afterwards, the first mobile spectrum auction to grant 2.6 
GHz spectrum for 4G services has been organized in November 2009 [31]. The regulator has not sought the 
revenue maximization as the goal of the auction instead associating the auction revenue with the 
administrative costs. Therefore, the auction has resulted in lower prices comparing the international 
equivalents [32]. In addition, auctioned 3G licenses hold service and technology-neutral features along with 
reselling rights through the mediation of the regulator to provide the market more power to decide the 
best utilization method for the spectrum.  
Finnish mobile market performs in highly competitive manner. Unbundling of the industry (1999) resulted 
in vertical separation of mobile operators into network operator and service operator.  In this way, mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNO) obtained the chance to place themselves into the value network (2003). 
Coincidence of MVNOs market entrance and the introduction of mobile number portability have affected 
the mobile market significantly. One of the successful MVNO in Finnish mobile market was Saunalahti on 
account of acquiring 8.5% of the market share in the end of 2004. Establishment of over ten MVNOs, 
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mobile number portability, and disallowance of bundling of mobile devices resulted fierce price 
competition and high churn rates in the mobile market. This situation pushed mobile operators to attract 
the customers via utilizing costly subscription acquisition methods such as offering up to 500 euros airtime 
or unrelated giveaways. Nevertheless, MVNOs have been consolidated with the incumbent operators in 
2006 which in the new industry organization MVNOs undertake brand operator responsibilities [33]. In 
other words, new industry organization ceased the operations of independent service operators. All these 
attempts pushed Finnish mobile prices both voice and broadband to the lowest of the European Union. On 
the other hand Finnish mobile market has not shown high development rate in 3G market in mid-2000s. To 
accelerate the 3G adoption, regulator has allowed handset and subscription bundling in 2006. Thus, the 
regulator moved its attention from price competition to technological innovation. Moreover, Finnish 
mobile operators use infrastructure sharing commonly to optimize their financial resources[34].   
As of 2013, three mobile operators dominate Finnish mobile market which two of them hold larger market 
share (Elisa 39%, TeliaSonera 36%) and one smaller scale (DNA 23%). In regulator side, the spectrum is 
currently assigned by auctioning. Latest spectrum auction is planned for the frequency bands which are 
freed from analog television broadcasting (2013).  In addition to this, regulator has started to spectrum 
refarming process by allowing the deployment of UMTS technology in 900 MHz band. Thus, more efficient 
use of lower frequencies together with higher frequencies has become possible.   
 
3.2 Chile 
Considering the telecom-related rankings, Chilean mobile market certainly can be counted as one of the 
developed markets in Americas. Chile has scored 4.3 points in Network Readiness Index which position the 
country ranks #39 in overall list along with  #2 in upper middle income category, #1 in the Southern 
America, #2 in Latin America (Barbados possess the #1 ranking). In addition, Chilean market has obtained 
full-score in internet and telephony ranking (#1 ranking). Moreover the country enjoys 100% mobile 
coverage as ensuring the mobile service availability for any populated area in the country. 
The Chilean Communication Regulatory Authority, Subtel (Subsecretaria de Telecomunicaciones) owns the 
responsibility to regulate the Chilean mobile market in respect to the regulation laws initially issued in 
1982-1983 and afterwards constantly updated. Chile takes into account ITU´s  global direction for region 2. 
After the first privatization in Latin America (CTC/Entel), Chilean regulator has granted first 2G licenses in 
800 MHz band to CTC and Bellsouth [35]. Chile has adopted beauty-contest method as the only licensing 
method so far together with allowing auctions in case of drawing. Also, granted licenses possess 
technology-neutral and service-harmonized attributes. By selecting these attributes, regulator has passed 
the technology selection process to the market players. Thus, the regulator has decreased its risk for 
selecting an inferior technology standard [36]. This decision led the existence of different mobile standards 
namely GSM, CDMA, TDMA D-AMPS. After all, the consolidation between mobile operators in 2006 
harmonized the technology by selecting GSM and 3GPP framework. In this way, the technology-
harmonization process has been completed by market dynamics instead of centrally taken decisions. In 
service-harmonization aspect, the regulator determines the services that can be deployed in certain 
frequency bands even though acting liberal in this context by enabling mobile converged services on the 
bands which were initially used for long-distance telephony.  Moreover, the regulator has issued spectrum 
licenses for two new market-entrants which has decreased the market concentration.  
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Chilean mobile market has 24 years of open competition period where at the present time there are five 
Chilean mobile operators (three of the mobile operators have the most of the market) as well as two 
mobile virtual network operators.  Besides, two of the mobile players; Telefónica and Claro (America Móvil) 
are multinational cooperations which are operating in Chile. In respect to new entrants and network 
updates, the investment that are made by mobile operators to  subscriber the amount of subscriber has 
reached a high value (49.8 euros) even though the mobile voice tariff PPP dollars/min and mobile ARPU 
values are relatively moderate. Also in Chilean market, prepaid subscribers (71%) dominate the mobile 
market [37]. To wrap of these parameters; prepaid subscriber ratio, mobile handset unbundling, unified 
technology standard are the factors which decrease the switching costs significantly.   
 
3.3 Turkey  
Turkey as having the second biggest population in Europe (after Germany) with middle-income level can be 
classified as one of the major economies in Europe. Even though the country does not possess advanced 
position in telecommunications-related rankings such as Network Readiness Index rank #71, Internet & 
Telephony Competition rank #62, Mobile Phone Subscription/100 populations rank #87; Turkey worth to be 
studied due to its macro-level economic scale. The country enjoys 5.1% dynamic economic growth rate for 
the period between 2003-2012 which exceeds the OECD average 1.7% and the global average 3.5% with a 
considerable margin [38]. Turkey´s emerging market and its influence to Europe and Middle East puts its 
telecommunications industry as an interesting case to analyze. 
Turkish telecommunications industry is regulated by Information and Communication Technologies 
Authority (Turkish: Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu) that is affiliated to the Ministry of Transport, 
Maritime Affairs and Communications [39]. Turkey is subject to ITU regulations for Region 1. 
First GSM services in Turkey have been initiated in 1994 under the revenue sharing agreement between 
state-owned fixed line monopoly Turkish Telecom and newly established mobile operators: Turkcell and 
Telsim. This agreement permitted these two operators to install their own mobile network and rollout their 
services under the conditions of the network ownership and 67% of the revenue belongs to Turkish 
Telecom [40]. As the conditions of the agreement do not accomplish liberal framework on private 
enterprises rights at all, regulator abandoned this scheme by issuing real licenses to these two operators in 
1998 to keep tune with the liberalization trend in the world [41]. However, the decisions which are taken 
until 1998 have played significant role in the market concentration. Firstly, Turkcell and Vodafone (formerly 
Telsim) have larger market penetration than the latecomer operator due to possessing first-mover 
advantage. Secondly, the regulator has switched Telsim network off in 1995-1996 for eight months. This 
regulatory move created a monopoly in the market and harmed Telsim´s brand value significantly. In the 
beginning of 2000s, the regulator has decided to grant three new licenses including one of them for state-
owned Turkish Telecom [42] [43]. The auction design lead one of the license remain unsold due to the high 
barriers of entry. As of 2004, the newcomer operators; Aria and Aycell have merged to constitute Avea 
[44]. This movement has determined the current players operating in the Turkish market. Turkish regulator 
distributed 3G licenses in 2008 via auctioning. In practical terms, the auction resulted with the distribution 
of the licenses based on the market power of the mobile operators. The licenses are technology-
harmonized and reselling rights are not determined [45].  
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Turkish mobile market consisted of dominantly from prepaid subscribers (63%, 2011). Also, mobile handset 
bundling is not commonly practiced. These two factors are affecting the level of switching costs 
significantly. Even though the mobile voice tariff/per minute PPP (0.40 dollars) is higher than United States 
or United Kingdom, ARPU level (monthly 12,35 dollars in 2009) is only over India and China among studied 
mobile markets in this research.   
3.4 United Kingdom 
Contrast to continental Europe, British market represents the Anglo-Saxon business approach in Europe. 
Combining this fact with dynamic and large market structure, British mobile market becomes an interesting 
case to analyze. In international rankings, United Kingdom has scored 5.1 points (rank #15) in Network 
Readiness Index. The country has competitive internet telephone market along with high subscription/100 
persons ratios (130.6) British mobile market is regulated by Office of Communications or shortly Ofcom.  
Ofcom has established in 2002 by the Office of Communications Act. Based on the act, Ofcom possess the 
full authority to regulate the broadcasting, telecommunications and postal industries in United Kingdom. 
United Kingdom has granted four second-generation licenses to the market. Based on the granting, 
Vodafone has started its operations in September 1993.  T-Mobile (September 1993), O2 (December 1993), 
Orange (April 1994) have entered market with their own network and services.  United Kingdom is the first 
country that has auctioned the UMTS telecom licenses in the world (March 2000). In the UMTS auctions, 
the regulator provided 5 licenses to the market even though there were 13 applications. The regulator has 
determined the auction rules carefully to maximize its revenues and utilization of the licenses. To prevent 
the secret pacts, each party may buy only one license where the sold licenses cannot be separated. The 
offered licenses are not identical: 2 large, 3 small bands have been granted. The license which has the 
largest bandwidth is reserved for the newcomer.  In this way, the regulator gave incentive to the 
newcomers to attract them to the mobile business. The newcomer has advantage by possessing the largest 
amount of spectrum (35 MHz) where the existing players may get the licenses which are 30 MHz and 25 
MHz.  The maximum license fee has been paid by Vodafone (5.9 billion pounds) where total revenue gotten 
from the auction has reached over 22 billion pounds. As the licensing auction resulted with extremely 
higher prices, the mobile operators placed financially in a hard position. The regulator has put 20% 
coverage regulation until 2009 to the mobile operators to provide 3G networks to the population. 
Furthermore, mobile operators may provide roaming between 2G and 3G networks. Recently, the regulator 
has issued 4G licenses in 2013 meanwhile raising 2.34 billion pounds less than expectations. As an overall, 
Ofcom is gradually changing the spectrum management approach by replacing the command-and-control 
to market mechanisms to enable trading and liberalization in the bands.   
British market has players which have multinational operator expertise along with many MVNOs operating 
in the market actively. Currently, Vodafone is the largest mobile network operator in the world by its 
multinational business. Moreover, Everything Everywhere brought foreign direct investment to the United 
Kingdom. Hence, we may assume that the players in the British mobile market have great managerial 
expertise.   
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3.5. Australia 
Australian Communications and Media Authority or shortly (ACMA) regulates Australian fixed line and 
mobile telecommunications industries. The primary responsibilities of the regulator are management of the 
delivery of communications services, enforcement industry and technical standard, monitoring the 
performance of the individual service providers along with measuring overall industry performance. Also, 
regulator has duties for the consumers such as advising them on their rights and safeguards.  Regulator 
handles the spectrum assignments based on its own internal policy decisions along with following ITU 
Region 3 recommendations.  
Australia may be accounted for one of the pioneer to utilize the liberal spectrum assignment policies. In 
1990, The Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics has diagnosed the Australian spectrum as 
under-utilized in many aspects. Due to this fact, Radio Communications Act has been prepared to reform 
the spectrum management in the country. With this act, the radio spectrum management is arranged in 
parallel to property rights along with introduction of spectrum pricing. The Radio Communications Act has 
put into practice in July 1993.  Australian regulator has defined the spectrum bands under four different 
categories: Apparatus Licenses, Spectrum Licenses, Class Licenses, Broadcasting and Defense Licenses. 
Apparatus Licenses signifies the traditional command-and-control type of licenses. The regulator authorizes 
the spectrum holders for the specific type of transmitter/receiver in certain location to provide a 
determined service. These licenses are issued for five years along with tradable rights. Secondly, spectrum 
licenses are determined neutral in respect to technology and service aspects. Spectrum licenses have 
longer licensing period (15 years) comparing to apparatus licenses together with tradable features. 
Moreover, these licenses can be leased, combined and broken up if the spectrum holder demands. The 
Australian regulator is changing the apparatus licenses to spectrum licenses to liberalize the overall 
spectrum management. Class licenses are used in shared basis. Lastly, broadcasting and defense licenses 
are treated in a different manner than the rest of the licenses [46] [47].   
Based on the Australian policy on the management of the spectrum licenses category, the spectrum is 
defined in three dimensional blocks: latitude, meridians and frequency. Hence, spectrum allocation in the 
country is completed region by region. Boundary conditions have been determined based on interference 
limits. Under the interference limits, spectrum owners are able to deploy any technology regardless of the 
type of the device and antenna. The regulator has determined the smallest indivisible spectrum piece as 
Standard Trading Unit (STU) which the spectrum may be traded or sub-let based on this unit. Thus, the 
players have the chance to separate or aggregate their spectrum holdings.  When spectrum holders make a 
deal on a spectrum transfer, the regulator does not hold any right to veto the transaction. The regulator 
only charges a small administration fee to process the transaction along with holding the up-to-date 
database about the list of spectrum licensees.  
During our research, we have identified Australia as an interesting case to study especially regarding on its 
spectrum licenses approach from the beginning. As we have seen in Table 3.1, Australian mobile market 
has already spectrum secondary trading market functioning in some degree.  
3.6 New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, the Commerce Commission regulates the telecommunications industry in respect to ITU 
Region 3 recommendations. The country has been accounted for the pioneer in assessment of mobile 
spectrum in liberal scheme. In 1989, the country has enabled the sale of spectrum licenses for radio, 
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television and cellular telecommunications under market-mechanisms practices like auctioning. Following 
this legislation, in 1990 New Zealand has organized the first spectrum auction in the world [48].  
 
The brave move to utilize auctioning for the spectrum assignment cannot be accounted as completely 
successful. Even tough the regulator has taken advise from a private consultation company (NERA) to 
determine the auction rules, the method utilized for the auctioning - closed envelope -  was not optimal.  
As the New Zealand has a relatively small telecommunications market, the number of participants to the 
auction was limited. Due to the limited participation, the auction has resulted with low licensing fees. Thus, 
if the regulator is seeking to maximize the revenue from the auctioning, this method has not resulted for 
that aim. Moreover, the lack of minimum price during the auction has resulted the assignment of a certain 
spectrum band for only 1 New Zealand dollar. As this spectrum auction is an experiment for both New 
Zealand and the rest of the world, the New Zealander regulator revised its auctioning method for the next 
spectrum auctions to increase the optimization.   
 
The regulator in New Zealand categorizes the spectrum licenses under four types: management rights 
regime (MRR), radio license regime (RLR), general user licenses (GULs), and other licenses. First of all, the 
Management Right Regime specifies the spectrum rights under two-tier system. The upper-tier spectrum 
management rights issues the holder the sole authority to assign the spectrum licenses to others. The 
Management Rights holder is the decision-maker check the spectrum bands for any technology and service 
in respect to interference limits. The lower-tier licenses are fully tradable. Secondly in radio license regime 
covers the licensing of sites and transmitters in both fixed and mobile networks. In this licensing type, the 
regulator determines the equipment and the method. These licenses are renewed yearly and not tradable. 
General user licenses are equivalent to class licenses in Australian way of spectrum categorization. These 
licenses include the license-exempt use of the spectrum. Lastly, the other licenses comprises non-
commercial radio licenses and state-owned spectrum licenses. 
 
Management Rights regime employed in New Zealand has distinct character in spectrum management 
method. As the spectrum rights determined under two-tiers system, the upper-tier license holder 
undertaken various roles. The first role is acting as a spectrum bank by being able to assign the resources it 
has to the market players. Secondly, the license holder determines the conditions of the usage including 
technology and service level which are initially under the duties of the regulator. The management rights 
can be aggregated and sub-divided or even mortgaged in a similar basis with land. However, the regulator 
does not have to assign the upper-tier rights to the market player in each case. Instead of that, the 
regulator may chose to keep the upper-tier rights for itself and then issuing only lower-tier rights to the 
market players. The spectrum licenses are issued in national basis.   
 
3.7 China 
 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology or shortly MIIT has been established in 2008 as a state 
agency in China to regulate the postal service, broadcasting, telecommunications, production of electronics 
and communication good. One of the key objectives of the regulator is determined as to promote to 
knowledge industry. Chinese regulator possesses more exclusive rights on supervising the industry than all 
the other regulators of this study. In this matter, the regulator has the right to appoint, promote or dismiss 
key officials of the mobile operators in China. Thus, the management boards of the mobile operators are 
determined by the direct influence of the regulator. However, any policy of the regulatory body should be 
supported by SPDC and State Council [49].  
 
First commercial mobile services in China have started in 1987 by China Telecom with the launch of 1G 
networks. As being the China Telecom was the pure monopoly in the market until 1994, the company has 
deployed two different 1G mobile standards as TACS as the primary standard and AMPS as the secondary 
standard. In July 1995, 2G services have been rolled-out the in the country. GSM has dominated to the 
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Chinese market along with limited deployment of CDMA IS-95. In 3G, China has fragmented the technology 
standard selection with WCDMA, CDMA2000 and homegrown TD-SCMA [50].  
 
In 1990s, Chinese mobile market has  grown rapidly as the mobile services have adopted by the large 
masses. During the 1994-2001, the number of mobile subscribers in China has doubled every year. Breaking 
of the monopoly has been a positive move for promoting market decentralization in the country.  However, 
this way has not ensured the transition to duopolistic market structure, because China Telecom was acting 
both as an operator and regulator in the market which puts the China Unicom in relatively disadvantaged 
position. For instance, service provision approval procedure restrained the network coverage development 
of China Unicom. Hence, the regulator has put some practical barrier to the newcomer operator. Due to 
these problems, a new regulatory body(MIIT) was formally established in April 1998. As MIIT is relatively 
neutral, the real duopoly period has started in China only in 1998. The establishment of the MIIT has 
changed the regulatory framework completely. The newly organized regulator has favored the raise of 
market penetration of China Unicom.  By this boost, China Unicom has increased its customer base 
significantly [51]. 
 
In 1999, State Council has issued CDMA license to China Unicom. In this way, China Unicom has increased 
its product portfolio by providing services over GSM and CDMA networks. GSM network has targeted to 
low-end subscribers who mostly use voice service where CDMA services has aimed medium and high-end 
subscribers enabling additional wireless data service.  In 1999, both of the mobile operators have started 
prepaid service without installation fee. With this offer, mobile market has enlarged towards the lower-end 
subscribers. 
 
3G studies in China have started by setting up 3G Technology Assessment Group in 1997. Finally, the 
regulator has granted 3G licenses in 2009 to mobile operators. During the spectrum assignment, Chinese 
regulator has protected its decision to keep Chinese mobile market to the state-owned companies. In this 
way, the profits earned from the mobile industry is received by the government and meanwhile Chinese 
market stay protected. Chinese regulator has utilized comparative bidding between state-owned 
companies o issue 3G licenses. Based on these method, 3G standard licenses have been granted base don 
company`s current performance, previous generation network situation and government policy to 
differentiate the companies. The regulator has not charged for the spectrum except a regular 
administrative fee.  
 
As a technology strategy, each mobile operator in China has received a different 3G standard to deploy in 
its network. Firstly, China Mobile, which is the biggest operator in terms of number of subscribers, has 
gotten homegrown TD-SCDMA along with largest frequency band (35 MHz). In international terms, TD-
SCDMA is least desirable due to lack of acceptance. However, in this way the regulator has aimed to put 
entry barrier to Chinese market for international product manufacturer while favoring the local 
manufacturers. As TD-SCDMA is a new technology standard, the deployment of the technology will take 
time and investment. However, the technology standard is completely compatible with the 4G 
infrastructure which will drive the pace later on to move to next generation technologies. China Mobile is 
aiming to launch 4G network in 2014. Also, company´s plan on integrating TD-LTE and TD-FDD technologies 
on the same device will further strengthen the position of this technological standard. Other operators in 
Chinese market; China Unicom has received WCDMA technology licenses for 30 MHz frequency range and 
China Telecom has gotten CDMA2000 licenses for the same amount of frequency. Both of the operators 
aim to prioritize improving its existing network instead of moving towards to deployment of 4G network.  
Due to their legacy deployments are not compatible with 4G network, transition to next generation will 
drive the level of investment. Thus, both companies target to develop their 3G services while exploiting the 
cheapening of 3G products. In this way, they will have additional market potential. 
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As China is the biggest mobile market in the world along with China Mobile is the biggest mobile operator 
in the world in terms of number of subscribers, China is considered as an important mobile market. 
Moreover, the state influence on market mechanism directly or indirectly differs the Chinese regulation 
framework from the rest of the major mobile regulatory bodies. Thus, analyzing the Chinese mobile market 
in this study becomes very attractive.  
3.8 India 
 
Indian telecommunications market, including both fixed and mobile networks, is the second largest market 
in respect to number of subscribers. Also, the country has the world´s third largest internet user base. The 
weight of information and communications industry on the overall economy has increased up to 7% with 
the boost of strong exports. The contribution of the industry to the economy is mainly accomplished by the 
private sector as the share of Indian government is quite limited [52]. Indian telecommunications industry 
is regulated by Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) which has been established in 1997 by the 
national parliament [53].    
Indian regulator has adopted “ad-hoc” approach for spectrum management.  The regulator develops its 
regulation strategy considering evolving market conditions and potential market development.  In this 
sense, Indian regulator has revised its decisions including the amount of spectrum available for the mobile 
services along with technology and service administration. The regulator embraced subscriber-based 
criterion in 2G services spectrum allocation. In this approach, mobile spectrum is issued to the mobile 
operators based on the number of subscriptions. If the mobile operator scales up its customer base, the 
regulator may issue additional spectrum bandwidth to satisfy the demand. The regulator has issued two 2G 
mobile licenses for every region in 1995, followed by the issue of the third license in 2001. After 2003, the 
regulator has adopted first come first served method to issue the spectrum licenses. Finally, 3G spectrum 
has been granted via auctioning which provided 14.5 billion dollars revenue for the government.  During 
the 3G auction, the regulator has sought to grant as many licenses as possible to maximize the revenue 
from the spectrum auction.  
Indian mobile telecommunications market presents different characteristics in urban and rural areas. As 
urban areas are relatively much more developed, the mobile penetration per 100 persons has increased to 
155 as of 2011. However, same figure in the rural areas stays about 35 subscriptions for 100 population. 
Thus, regions in India show great variety based on the level of mobile market.  As Indian regulator grants 
the licenses based on regional level, the heterogonous character of the market results with variance in the 
prices of the spectrum in different regions.  
After 3G auctioning in India, it has been observed that none of the mobile operator has succeeded to 
provide national coverage in the country. Additionally, mobile tariffs are one of the lowest in the world due 
to high competition level between the operators. These factors boosted the use of multi-SIM phone to take 
advantage of different pricing plans and escape from the high roaming rates.  
 
Indian mobile operators are responding the increased demand under limited spectrum resources along 
with infrastructure problems. As the wired networks have not possess adequate quality as well as limited 
coverage, utilization of offloading options for the mobile networks becomes problematic. To solve this 
problem, recently regulator has put effort on to practice the infrastructure sharing between the mobile 
operators.   
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3.9 United States  
 
Federal Communications Commission or shortly FCC is the institution that is responsible for regulating 
mobile telecommunications in the United States. FCC has established in 1934 and at the present time the 
regulator acts as an independent agency along with maintaining its own budget from licensing fees. The 
president and the commissioners of FCC are assigned by U.S. president and senate. In ITU 
recommendations, United States is placed in region 2 [54].  
  
Before 1993, FCC has utilized lottery, beauty contest and first come first served mechanisms to assign the 
spectrum resources. However, these approaches possess the risk of inefficient utilization of resources, high 
cost of assigning process in terms of capital and time. Due to these reasons, following to 1993 FCC has 
obtained the permission to sell the spectrum licenses via auctions. Embracing auctioning is the most 
prevalent spectrum assignment method at the moment. American spectrum allocation system allows the 
regulator to assign the spectrum for limited period of time instead of granting the ownership of the 
spectrum. The spectrum plan determines the utilization way of the spectrum such as licensed vs. 
unlicensed use, private carriage vs. common carriage, commercial vs. noncommercial. In unlicensed bands, 
the regulator determines the transmitting equipment under certain power limits and technical standards to 
prevent the potential interference. The licensed bands require valid operating license under certain rules 
from the regulator [55].  
 
In United States, the frequency licenses are granted regionally. Regional licenses increase the number of 
licensees along with the potential interference risk. As the licenses may contain complementary value to 
each other, the value of the newly assigned spectrum set differs based on current spectrum holdings. The 
regulator assigns the spectrum via synchronous auction method to sustain the efficient allocation. In this 
way, mobile operators are able to exploit the synergy between the licenses and exert the complementary 
value. Moreover, the regulator has enabled to utilize the legacy spectrum holding for next generation 
technologies to reduce the pressure on the mobile operators at the 3G auctions. Thus mobile operators do 
not have to bid aggressively for 3G licenses or being out of market completely. Mobile operators may utilize 
legacy spectrum holdings to provide voice, data and broadband services. Also, they may lease or transfer 
spectrum from another player if agreed.  
At the present time, four mobile operators –Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile USA 
have national coverage. Additionally MetroPCS, Leap Wireless and U.S. Cellular are operating regional 
based in the American market. Recently, Japanese mobile operator Softbank has acquired Sprint Nextel 
(2013).  Softbank has declared that the company will keep Sprint Nextel as a separate entity following the 
acquisition. Verizon Wireless is formed as a joint venture between Verizon Wireless and Vodafone. AT&T 
Mobility has proposed acquisition of T-Mobile USA (2011). However, concerns from U.S. Department of 
Justice and other market players regarding the market competition led withdraw from the acquisiton 
proposal. After this failed acquisition, MetroPCS has agreed for a merger with T-Mobile USA (2012). In this 
way, both companies will increase the level of utilization of their network and spectrum holdings [56].  
As American mobile market is advanced with respect to mobile ecosystem arrangements, extracting the 
market dynamics can be accounted as major interest. Moreover, FCC is one of the most followed regulators 
in the world based on its spectrum policies and market regulations.  Regarding these arguments, American 
market is an interesting  case to include to  this research work.  
 
 
 
 
17 
3.10 Japan  
Japanese mobile telecommunications industry is regulated by Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications.  Japanese regulator has never utilized market-based spectrum allocation mechanisms 
favoring for beauty-contests to perform spectrum granting. Japan is placed in Region 3 in ITU 
recommendation spectrum allocation.  
First commercial 1G mobile services in Japan has been initiated by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) 
in 1979. Following that, NTT has been privatized in 1985 to boost the competition in the 
telecommunications market. In 1988, KDDI has started its 1G analog mobile services as being the second 
operator in the country. Japanese market has met with digital mobile services in 1993 by the services of 
NTT DoCoMo. The company has utilized TDMA service which is branded as Personal Digital Cellular.  In 
1994, Softbank has come to the market as being third mobile operator in the country.  In 1999, NTT 
DoCoMo has initiated i-mode service to enable mobile internet services. In i-mode ecosystem, the mobile 
operator has undertaken the ecosystem orchestrator role which issued NTT DoCoMo great power to 
determine and coordinate the other market players. The success of i-mode in Japan has created great 
attention in Europe, Asia and European markets. In this sense, the mobile operators in these markets have 
started to deploy similar services through partnership with NTT DoCoMo [57]. As a result, Japanese mobile 
industry has started actively export its business approach to abroad. However, this business approach has 
not succeeded in the rest of the world in the same way as in Japan due to differences in market structure. 
In Japanese mobile ecosystem, mobile operators have the greatest influence and meanwhile they are the 
ones who extract the most of the value.  In contrast to Japan in the rest of the world, the mobile operators 
were not possessing similar power. Additionally, device manufacturers such as Nokia was not interested in 
to produce products those are compatible with i-mode services. These reasons have resulted great 
disparity in mobile internet services between Japan and the rest of the world.  
Japanese regulator has granted 3G licenses via beauty contest to the market players without licensing fees. 
After the spectrum allocation, NTT DoCoMo has initiated its WCDMA services under FOMA name. Following 
NTT DoCoMo, KDDI has started its 3G services through utilizing CDMA2000 technology. Softbank 
(previously J-Phone and Vodafone Japan) has used WCDMA technology. With these deployments, Japanese 
mobile market was dominated by different 3G standards. 
Until 2008, only locked mobile handsets were sold in Japanese market. These handsets were bundled with 
SIM-cards which enables to use the mobile device only in certain mobile operator network. Also, mobile 
operators were not selling separate SIM-cards to their subscribers which have their own device. Locking 
enforcements in the country created great switching costs between the mobile operators meanwhile 
assigning great power to the mobile operators. Mobile operators have provided all access, device and 
applications from one hand to the subscribers. In 2008, new regulation has forced mobile operators to 
unbundle service and device charges. With the implementation of this regulation, the switching costs in 
Japan may decrease in the long term. 
As Japanese mobile market possess unique character in respect to difference in implementations from the 
rest of the world makes it interesting case to study. During our research we have also noted that Japanese 
market is a very hard to analyze due to lack of information in English from the official institutions.   
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3.11. Sweden  
 
Swedish mobile telecommunications industry is regulated by Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS). As 
well as regulating the mobile industry, the regulator has objectives to secure telecommunications services 
for people with disability, the procurement of basic services and promotion of broadband services. Sweden 
lies down to region 1 in ITU recommendations.  
 
GSM services in Sweden has started in 1992 by Telia, Comviq (Tel2) and Vodafone. At the present time, four 
mobile network operators provide mobile services to Swedish subscribers. The biggest mobile operator in 
terms of number of subscribers, TeliaSonera is created with a merger between Swedish operator Telia and 
Finnish operator Sonera (2002). Prior to TeliaSonera, Telia has a background on being Swedish 
telecommunications monopoly. Secondly, Tele2 has established in 1970s and challenged to government 
monopoly market. The aim of Tele2 was to challenge the monopoly pushing the market towards a more 
open liberal scheme. In this way, Tele2 would gain ground in the telecommunications market in Sweden. As 
being successful operations in Swedish market, Tele2 has gone to other mobile markets using its expertise 
in challenging the dominant monopoly. Telenor, the Norwegian incumbent, has tried to enter the Swedish 
market via a merger with Telia (1999). Following the failure of merger attempt, Telenor has finally come to 
Swedish market via acquisition of Vodafone Sweden (2005). Hutchison 3G is providing UMTS services to the 
Swedish customers. Hutchison is a Hong Kong based company operating in Denmark and Sweden. As an 
interesting note,  Hutchison 3G has not separated its operations in Denmark and Sweden as both networks 
are perceived as home network. Overall in Swedish mobile market, all of the mobile network operators 
have multi-national character.  
 
3G frequency spectrum in Sweden has been completed in December 2000 via beauty contest method. At 
that period of time, it was not possible to organize auctions for sale of spectrum in the country. Ten 
companies have applied for the license where the regulator preferred to distribute four licenses. With the 
3G licensing, Hutchison 3G came to the Swedish mobile market as the fourth player. The regulator has not 
charged license fees to the operators but the requirement for the 3G licenses were the national coverage of 
99,98% until the end of 2003. Also, infrastructure sharing up to 70% has been allowed as well as supported 
by the regulator [58].  
 
3.12 Summary 
 
In this section, we will introduce a summary of the mobile market descriptions in the table below. The 
summary table will highlight the important characteristics of each studied mobile market.   
 
 
Mobile Market Some highlights 
Finland - Equal spectrum distribution between players 
- Competitive market with effective regulatory frame 
Chile - Most developed mobile market in South America 
- Technology-neutral spectrum harmonized by market over time 
- 2 new MNOs entered the market recently 
Turkey - Strong incumbent market share 
- Low level of ARPU and investment comparing to rest of European mobile 
markets 
United Kingdom - Harmonization of European rules with Anglo-Saxon business 
understanding 
- Recently, spectrum licenses are becoming to technology neutral even 
though the market is still harmonized 
Australia - Spectrum reselling is allowed 
- Allocation of spectrum licenses in region level. 
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- Geographical focus by MNOs in spectrum holdings 
New Zealand - First mobile spectrum auction in the world 
- Two-tier mobile spectrum administration system 
- Spectrum reselling is supported 
China - Regulator has great influence on the mobile market 
- Incumbent operator has great dominance in the market 
- All of the mobile operators are owned by the state companies 
India - Fragmented mobile market where none of the MNOs is able to provide 
national coverage 
- The lowest prices, ARPU and investment per subscriber level in this study 
United States - Different mobile standards exists in the market with various market shares 
- Regional spectrum granting with auctioning method 
Japan - Different mobile technology standards exist in the market 
- Handset bundling and SIM-locking are prevalent 
Sweden - Possess good rankings in mobile related rankings such as Network 
Readiness Index 
- Each MNO in the market have multinational structure. 
Table 3.2 Important characteristics from studied mobile markets. 
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4. Analysis of Case Markets 
 
In this chapter, we will complete analysis on spectrum policy and market structure. We will investigate the 
parameters one by one along with highlighting the up-to-date trends in the studied mobile markets 
regarding to relevant parameter.  
 
4.1 Spectrum Policy Analysis  
Spectrum regulation constitutes a notable framework by reflecting the regulators´ approach to administer 
the mobile market. For reaching broad understanding of the objectives of the regulator and regulator-
market relations, it is a must to complete spectrum policy analysis.  
Each mobile market in this study has its own regulatory mechanism, which is in a way connected to the 
government bodies, to arrange the mobile market in that country. Even though, every regulator is 
independent from each other in theory, undoubtedly the regulators may possess influence to each other. 
Besides, the regulators may have similar kind of opinions to create the mobile market. Moreover, they may 
like to observe the results of the certain regulatory decisions in other markets to visualize the effects of the 
similar actions in their own market.  Thus, these factors create similarities or dissimilarities between mobile 
market regulatory frameworks.  
Differences between the regulatory bodies in respect to the power they possess, their hierarchy, the way of 
regulating and cultural norms create toughness in mapping the spectrum policies of different countries in 
the same framework. Therefore in this section, we are observing the parameters which describe the mobile 
spectrum policy of the regulatory bodies.  In this way, we aim to analyze the spectrum policy framework as 
well as up-to-date spectrum situation in each studied mobile market.  By completing these analysis, we will 
be able to show the effects and relations of the spectrum policy parameters. 
The parameters, which we will examine as a potential explaining factor in spectrum policy, are; market 
share, Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), Spectrum Herfindahl-Hirscmann Index, Reselling Rights, 
Technology Neutrality / Harmonization, Service Neutrality / Harmonization.  In this section, we will scan this 
parameters theoretically what they mean and corresponding up-to-date data in the studied markets.  
4.1.1 Market share  
Market share, as a key indicator to measure market performance, is the percentage of market in terms of 
units sold or revenues earned (as shown Equation 4.1 and 4.2)  accounted for a specific organization . As 
being less dependent to the macro-level economic environment, market share is accepted as an important 
parameter that demonstrates how well a specific firm doing in the market. Also, it is counted as a 
managerial objective to improve business performance. Moreover, losses in the market share can signal 
long-term problems of viability of a business. 
Unit Market share (%) = 100 * Unit Sales / Total Market Unit Sales    (Equation 4.1)  
Revenue Market share (%) = 100 * Sales Revenue / Total Market Sales Revenue    (Equation 4.2) 
Possessing a large market share arises many advantages for the firms.  The major advantage; economies of 
scale provides cost advantage, brand awareness among customers, accessing superior advertising channels, 
better technology and R&D capabilities, better bargaining position with distributers, suppliers, customers 
and regulators. Cost advantage affects the competitiveness significantly especially if the fixed costs 
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comprise relatively high fragment of the total costs. Brand awareness provides better visibility to the 
customers and enables the firms charge higher prices than competitors for the similar kind of services [59]. 
Being able to charge more without losing customer base improves the financial statement of a firm such as 
revenue and profit levels. Holding a prominent market share raises the capabilities for influencing the 
regulator for alignment new laws and regulations with the firm capabilities to create competitive 
advantage. Also, the firm may possess more power in its ecosystem, which may lead to influence the 
direction of ecosystem [60].  
Telecommunications industry requires high level of investment, large advertisement campaigns, superior 
R&D capabilities, and efficient distribution mechanisms. Mobile operators should hold radio frequency 
licenses to initiate their operations in a mobile market. Thus, the first barrier to entry is to obtain spectrum 
from the regulators. The regulators grant the licenses based on the determined selection criteria by 
adopted issuing methods. As utilizing the auctioning methodology has become more prevalent, the mobile 
operators also have financial constraints as an additional entry barrier. Moreover, the regulators may 
dictate high coverage rules, price caps, and certain technological restrictions which drive the roll-out costs 
significantly. Secondly, sustaining the competitiveness in the market in terms of technological and 
marketing capabilities requires continuous expenditure. Thus, achieving profitability requires broad 
customer base to pay off all these capital expenditures. 
As mobile markets are mostly oligopolies, market share is a crucial element to compete in the market with 
the rest of the players. Buzzell et. al [61], Schmalensee [62] have stated that higher market share and seller 
concentration are associated with higher profitability. However, building customer base and improving the 
market share require a complicated process in telecommunications industry. Bijward et. al stated that it is 
easier to acquire market penetration when the market penetration in general is low and the industry is 
highly concentrated [63]. This statement explains the reasons which we do not observe new entrants in 
many mobile markets.  
Our research on the studied mobile markets gave insight about the market composition. We have seen that 
the regulators may issue the spectrum licenses in regional or national basis. In regional licenses, the mobile 
penetration can be limited only in some part of the country which creates “regional operator” concept. 
Also, the operators may have variant amount of spectrum in different geographical regions, which may lead 
to different strategies as focusing wide range of distribution channels, higher advertisement budgets and 
better quality of service where on the other regions these features may be more limited.   
We have gathered market share data of the selected countries in Table 4.1. China clearly has the most 
dominant incumbent namely; China Mobile among the studied mobile markets in this research [64]. The 
country had pure monopoly period between 1987-1994, which is followed by limited competition period. 
During the limited competition period, the incumbent operator has undertaken operator and market 
regulator roles, which puts the new-entrant in a competitively disadvantaged position. This period has 
ended by the establishment of a more neutral and independent regulator in 1998 (MII). At the present 
time, Chinese mobile market has three state-owned mobile operators. [13]. Due to the latency in the 
transition to pure duopoly  and lack of private enterprises in the market, Chinese mobile market possess 
great difference in market share between operators in China.  
Secondly, Turkish incumbent operator Turkcell possesses slightly over half of the subscribers in the mobile 
market [65]. We believe that regulator´s decision about stopping Telsim´s (nowadays Vodafone, second 
biggest mobile operator) operations for nine months period undermined Telsim´s brand value significantly 
and created a monopoly in the market. The incumbent operator has maintained significantly its customer 
base especially due to  the winner curse in license auction (2001) [66], bringing Telsim under state control 
(2004) [16], latency in number portability deployment (2008) [67].  
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Historically, New Zealand has structured its mobile market with market-mechanisms. New Zealand is the 
first country in the world that has utilized auctioning method for licensing the spectrum. The country has 
adopted an approach which defines spectrum licensing under property rights regime. However, mobile 
market in New Zealand is quite small and number of participants to the auctions is limited. Based on these 
factors, we observe a big gap in market share between the players in New Zealand even though market-
based approaches have been embraced.  
Traditionally, mobile players in Japan have strong positions and they have undertaken the ecosystem leader 
role. Japanese subscribers have accessed the mobile access, phone and application via the intermediately 
of the mobile operator until the recent changes in the regulations [68]. Also, SIM-locking, handset bundling, 
incompatible standards have increased the switching costs between the operators significantly. High 
switching costs decrease the customer desire to switch their supplier. 
While Australia utilized similar market mechanism licensing scheme with New Zealand, as a difference 
Australian regulator has preferred to issue the licenses in regional basis. This arrangement resulted 
asymmetries between the license holdings from region to region between operators [69]. As some 
operators focused on more to hold licenses in urban areas, the others have relatively larger amount of 
spectrum in rural areas. Thus, Australian operators have more focus than New Zealand equivalents.  
Chile has relatively two close market share holder (37.9% Movistar and 37.8% Entel respectively) and one 
operator a little behind (23.5% Claro). Recently, Chilean regulator has decided to open up the Chilean 
market by issuing licenses for the new-entrants [22]. As the newcomers invest on their networks, we may 
naturally expect that they will increase their market share. Thus, in the future we expect that Chilean 
mobile market may be much more fragmented than now it is as the mobile services of newcomer operators 
roll-out. However, it is necessary to keep a keynote that as seen in many other mobile markets there might 
be a probability of a merger between the existing players and the newcomers.   
GSM services in Sweden have started in 1992 by three operators namely; Telia, Comviq (nowadays Tele2) 
and Vodafone. The fourth player has joined to competition with some delay. 3G licenses have been issued 
in 2000 by beauty-contest.  The regulator has given incentive for infrastructure-sharing which drives the 
competition to the service-level rather than infrastructure-level. 
Finnish GSM market has been initiated by the first services of Radio Linja (nowadays Elisa) in December 
1991 which is followed by the services of Sonera in June 1992. The third mobile operator has come to the 
play in 1998. The regulator has driven price-competition between mobile operators until 2006, afterwards 
replacing the strategy with technology-incentive to boost the transition to 3G networks.  
The UK and USA have similar kind of regulatory framework. Four players are active in British mobile market 
which three of them quite equal market shares where the fourth is behind (latercomer). British regulatory 
has approved the merger between Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom UK ventures. Thus, the biggest 
mobile player; Everything Everywhere (EE) has been established [70]. In United States, seven players have 
mainly constituted the mobile market where four of them have large customer base and the rest have 
more restricted number of subscribers. The difference between UK and USA, the licenses in UK have been 
granted in national level where the American licenses are regional based.  
Indian mobile market is very much fragmented with high number of mobile operators. The licenses are 
distributed regionally and none of the mobile operators have succeeded to reach national coverage. The 
regulator issue very limited amount of mobile operator to each operator and then mobile operators have 
the right to request more spectrum bandwidth from the regulator in respect to number of subscribers. The 
biggest operator in India holds only 19,75 % of the market share [28]. Thus, we can state that Indian mobile 
market highly fragmented between many players. 
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Mobile Carrier Market Shares Composition for Selected Countries by Number of Subscribers 
Country Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 & (or 
the Rest) 
Data Updated 
China 66% (China 
Mobile) 
20% (China 
Unicom 
14% (China 
Telecom) 
- Q2 2012  
Turkey 51,1% (Turkcell) 28,53% 
(Vodafone) 
20,36% (Avea) - Q2 2012 
New Zealand 47,8% (Vodafone) 37,6% 
(Telecom) 
13,6% 
(2Degrees) 
- Q2 2011 
Japan 47,7% (DoCoMo) 28,4% (au) 23,9% 
(SoftBank) 
- Q3 2012 
Australia 43% (Telstra) 33% (Optus) 24% 
(Vodafone) 
- Q4 2011 
Chile  42% (Telefonica) 38% (Entel) 20% (Claro) - 2011 
Sweden 40,4% 
(TeliaSonera) 
31,6% (Tele2) 16,5% (Telenor) 9,0% (Hi3G) 2010 
Finland 39% (Elisa) 36% 
(TeliaSonera) 
23% (DNA) - 2011 
UK 34% (Everthing 
Everywhere) 
27% (o2) 25% 
(Vodafone) 
10% (3) Q3 2011 
US  33% (Verizon) 32% (AT&T) 17% (Sprint) 11% (T-Mobile),  
3% (MetroPCS), 
2% 
(LeapWireless), 
2% US Cellular  
 
Q1 2011 
India 19,75% (Bharti)  16,86% 
(Reliance) 
16,60% 
(Vodafone) 
The rest* Q3 2011 
*The rest is 11,76% (Idea), 10,86% (BSNL), 9,43% (Tata), 6,89% (Aircel), 3,87% (Uninor), 1,64% (Sistema), 
0,64 (MTNL), 0,62% (Videocon), 0,40% (Stel), 0,36% (Etisalat), 0,13% (HFCL) 
Table 4.1. Mobile Carrier Market Shares Composition for Selected Countries by Number of Subscribers 
4.1.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index   
Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index (HHI index) is a scale that is utilized to measure the level of market 
concentration in a determined industry. The index has gained visibility after the adoption by United States 
Department of Justice Federal Reserve in the analysis of competitive effects of mergers. American officials 
take into account HHI index to observe the market concentration and change in market concentration by 
post-mergers. Based on these criteria, the decisions regarding approve or reject mergers and acquisitions 
are given [71].  
As telecommunications markets are mostly oligopolies, it is important to guarantee the social welfare and 
availability of goods and services. Thus, the regulatory bodies observe the market and if needed intervene 
the market to preserve these aims. One important tool for assessing the realization level of these targets is 
certainly observing the market with HHI index.  
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HHI index is evaluated by calculating the sum of the squares of market shares of fifty largest firms in the 
market. As the number of players in telecommunications industry is limited, all of the players actively 
operating in the market have been taken into account during the calculation. For instance a monopoly 
which in practical terms holds 100% of the market share results HHI = 10 000. On the other hand two equal 
players which each of them possess 50% market share leads HHI = 5000. The calculation phase is followed 
by the interpretation of the index values.  
As described in Table 4.2, U.S. Department of Justice/Federal Commission has determined guidelines for 
HHI values which categorize the market based on the value range. In the old guidelines, the market 
concentration boundaries have been determined as 1000 and 1800 between concentrated, moderately 
concentrated and highly concentrated market structures. The recent research for new guidelines embraced 
fact-based approach while preserving the spirit of current enforcements [72]. New guidelines renew the 
boundaries from 1000 to 1500 and from 1800 to 2500. Thus, the new arrangements define market 
concentration in a more flexible manner.  
Old Guidelines   
Unconcentrated HHI < 1000 No action 
Moderately concentrated 1000 < HHI < 1800 Red flag if ∆HHI > 100 
Highly concentrated HHI > 1800 Significantly competitive 
concerns if ∆HHI > 50 
   
New Guidelines   
Unconcentrated HHI <1500 No action 
Moderately concentrated 1500 < HHI < 2500 ∆HHI > 100 warrants scrutiny 
Highly concentrated HHI > 2500 100 < ∆HHI < 200 warrants 
scrutiny 
∆HHI > 200 presumed likely 
to increase market power 
Table 4.2. Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
 
Order Country  HHI Value 
1 China 4952 
2 New Zealand 3883 
3 Turkey 3839 
4 Japan 3653 
5 Chile 3608 
6 Australia 3514 
7 Finland 3346 
8 Sweden 2952 
9 United Kingdom 2610 
10 United States 2540 
11 India  1360 
Table 4.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Values for Studied Markets 
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During our research, we have calculated HHI values for studied mobile markets from the up-to-date 
gathered data from regulator, mobile operator and consulting company websites. Based on these 
calculations, we have created Table 4.3 above. 
The results present important findings related to market concentration. As Chinese mobile incumbent holds 
66% of the subscription base in the country, Chinese mobile market is placed to the top of HHI list. The 
countries, which have three mobile operators, filled the first seven places except Chile as the country just 
accepted two new operators to its mobile market.  Sweden and United Kingdom have four players 
operating in their markets. The bottom of the list is filled by United States and India, which have large 
population figures with regional licenses. Especially India is the most fragmented mobile market in this 
study in which none of the mobile operators in the country cannot meet national network coverage.  
 
4.1.3 Spectrum HHI  
The spectrum assignment strategies of the regulatory bodies have great deal of impact on the mobile 
industry. The primary reason is surely that mobile operators need permission to use the spectrum for 
initiating their mobile services. Besides, the method of spectrum assignment has an effect on the mobile 
players. For instance, if the regulator chooses to grant the spectrum licenses via beauty-contest, then the 
crucial priority of the mobile operators is to fulfill the criteria which have determined by the regulator. On 
the other hand, if the regulator decides to grant the licenses via auctions, financial matters become crucial. 
3G-spectrum assignment auctions in United Kingdom and Germany resulted in extremely high prices which 
obstructed the financial situation of the mobile operators and put them in a difficult situation to invest in 
new technologies [73]. Lastly, the amount of spectrum assigned for mobile operators have impact the 
mobile market. As the frequency spectrum crucial resource to serve to subscribers, the mobile operators 
should have adequate spectrum to provide their services. If the amount of spectrum that a certain mobile 
operator possesses is relatively small, the number of subscriptions may be limited due to the congestion 
risk in the network. Also, if the operators have only license for certain geographical areas, then the mobile 
operator cannot serve the rest of the regions along with losing the subscribers who would like to have 
service availability in all regions. Thus, this consideration has an effect on the market positions of the 
mobile operators. In this section, we will analyze the mobile operator spectrum concentration in studied 
markets in respect to Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. 
In the previous section, we have analyzed the HHI value via taking the input from market penetration of the 
mobile operators. Here we will introduce our research on spectrum composition concentration.  To 
describe this concept, we have combined the Herfindahl-Hirschman index with the spectrum holdings 
which we have called “spectrum HHI”. The input of this parameter is the percentage of the spectrum of a 
mobile operator possesses relative to total spectrum that is assigned for mobile services by the regulator. 
As the licenses are national and the spectrum assignment data is widely available, the calculation was 
straightforward. On the other hand during the evaluation of the cases in which the mobile licenses are 
regional or the spectrum distribution data to each operator in the market is not completely available, we 
made some assumptions to finalize our calculations. Moreover, the data about the amount of spectrum 
each mobile operator holds and the percentage of the spectrum holdings to the total mobile spectrum in 
the studied markets can be found in the Appendix B. 
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First of all during the first phase of our research we were considering whether to use symmetric or 
asymmetric allocation of the mobile spectrum between mobile operators as a parameter in this study. 
However, our data gathering process has proved that Finland is the only country that has assigned all 
spectrum bands symmetrically between the mobile operators among studied mobile markets. Finnish 
regulator, FICORA, has initially granted 2G and 3G licenses via beauty-contest. In this way, the regulator 
took attention to give the same amount of resources to not to put any mobile operator in a disadvantaged 
position. However, in the upcoming auction for the assignment of digital dividend bandwidth, the regulator 
put the spectrum cap as 50% of the auctioned spectrum for any operator. Thus, in the future symmetrical 
spectrum distribution in each band in the Finnish mobile spectrum allocation table may change.   
Chilean mobile market has in total five mobile operators which two of them new entrants.  As the regulator 
has decided to open up the mobile market to the new players, the regulator has granted new spectrum 
bands for the new entrants. In practical terms, this method was the only way to bring new players to the 
market as reselling rights are not defined in the country and the desire of the existing operators for actively 
involving the secondary spectrum market is unclear. Even though, the beauty contest method has been 
always utilized by the regulator to assign the mobile spectrum in Chile, the asymmetric amount of spectrum 
has been granted to the mobile operators. The regulator has opened the 1.7 / 2.1 GHz spectrum band for 
new entrants; VTR and Nextel where the existing operators hold spectrum holdings respectively in lower 
bands. This situation may put the new entrants in a disadvantaged situation due to the worse propagation 
characteristics of the radio links in higher bands. Thus, the new entrants should deploy a higher density of 
network infrastructure to handle the coverage problems which leads additional amount of investment. 
Furthermore between the new entrants, Nextel holds double amount of mobile spectrum comparing to 
VTR which results the rise of asymmetry between these operators. When we review the overall mobile 
spectrum, we have observed that only Telefónica and Claro have same amount of spectrum in each 
spectrum band. Even though, Nextel and Entel have also same amount of spectrum, their spectrum 
holdings are in different bands. As spectrum bands have different characteristic, the value of the spectrum 
holdings of Nextel and Entel may not be assessed as equal.  VTR clearly possesses the smallest portion of 
mobile spectrum in the country. Based on the current spectrum plan, we may say that new release of 
spectrum or spectrum refarming may be needed in the future due to the fact that new technologies need 
the use of multiple bands; lower and higher frequencies at the same time.  As a keynote to our calculations, 
we have made our calculation based on the current overall mobile spectrum plan.  
Turkish GSM market has started by the initiation of services by Turkcell and Telsim (nowadays Vodafone). 
In the first place, the regulator had issued same amount of bandwidth in 900 MHz band for both operators 
to rollout their services.  Then, as the new entrants come to the market (2001), the mobile spectrum plan 
has become asymmetrical between operators.  By spectrum assignment to the newcomer, the regulator 
has enabled the utilization of 1800 MHz band in the mobile services for the first time. With the consolation 
of the new entrants (2004), the smallest mobile operator by number of subscribers has gained the largest 
amount of mobile spectrum where incumbents had still equal shares. As 3G licenses have distributed in 
Turkey, the regulator had determined four different 3G licenses where the bandwidth of each of the license 
is different. The auction had resulted in a parallel with the market share of the operators. Thus, Turkcell the 
largest mobile operator by the subscriber penetration has gotten the licence A, where Vodafone B and 
Avea C. Fourth license had been reserved for possible new entrant to the market.  As a nutshell, the current 
situation in the Turkish mobile spectrum plan shows that the smallest mobile operator by number of 
subscriber hold the largest amount of spectrum (36%), then the biggest mobile operator Turkcell follows 
(33,3%), and lastly Vodafone has the smallest portion of the spectrum (31%).   
 
 
27 
The input for the calculations in New Zealand mobile market has been completed based on the data 
available in the national regulatory website based on the total assignment of the spectrum [74]. In contrast 
to New Zealand, Australia had a complicated spectrum assignment where the licenses are regional based 
and the spectrum dominance of the mobile operators varies from region to region.  We have decided to 
use the spectrum plans for Melbourne and Sydney which are the most populated regions in the country. 
Also, economic activities in these regions are in relatively high level. Thus, we have decided to make an 
assumption to calculate Spectrum-HHI value as an average of separate spectrum HHI of these regions and 
then make an assumption that this value represents the overall Australia.  
We have reviewed the Japanese mobile spectrum plan for all the bands. As four players possess holdings 
where one of them (eAccess) has quite a small proportion of spectrum amount (10%) comparing to the rest 
of the players [75].   
Swedish mobile spectrum plan has been divided between seven players. In Swedish market as a difference 
we have seen that the mobile operators had built joint ventures which hold the spectrum on behalf of its 
own name. Net4Mobility is the joint venture of Tele2 and Telenor where LTE Svenska UMTSLicens AB is 
established by Tele2 and TeliaSonera. These ventures hold 31% of the total mobile spectrum.   
In United Kingdom, the biggest mobile spectrum owner is EE (Everything Everywhere) has been created by 
a merger between the UK ventures of France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom. Even though EE possess the 
largest amount of the mobile spectrum, the company does not have any holdings in the 900 MHz band. 
Thus, it would not be possible to exploit lower frequencies for EE.  The mobile operator 3 possess its mobile 
holdings only in 2G MHz band which currently operates its 3G services. As an overall, the UK spectrum band 
is organized asymmetrically between the mobile players [76]. 
In China, we have only included the 3G spectrum plan during spectrum-HHI calculations due to the lack of 
public information in English about the overall spectrum strategy between the mobile operators. 3G 
spectrum licenses in China have been granted by comparative bidding. The results of the spectrum 
assignment were parallel with the market share composition where the bigger player gets the largest 
amount of spectrum vice versa.  
Indian regulator issues regional-based licenses to the mobile players. In Indian market, none of the mobile 
operators have succeeded to provide service in the national level [77]. This situation has even hardened our 
calculation for a national HHI for Indian market. Thus to resolve this problem, we have calculated three 
separate HHI values for Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata as the most developed regions of the country. Then, we 
have taken the average of the separate regional HHI values. In this way, we have reached the overall Indian 
spectrum-HHI value.  
United States mobile spectrum plan has same issues with India and Australia regarding the calculations of 
spectrum-HHI value. In Australian case we have included the regions which are most populated. On the 
other hand as India is densely populated in every region, we have selected three developed regions and 
calculated the resulted spectrum-HHI value based on this data. Nevertheless, we believed that these 
methods do not reflect the insight of the U.S.  mobile spectrum plan due to the fact that it is hard to elect 
the areas which may show the overall market. As plenty of data available in U.S. market, we have selected 
to use spectrum holdings/ millions subscribers data source to continue our calculations [9]. From this ratio 
via using the U.S. population we have ended up with the spectrum holdings value. Based on the spectrum 
holdings value, we have calculated the Spectrum-HHI. Later on, we have calculated Spectrum-HHI based on 
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overall spectrum holdings of the operators regardless how many subscribers they serve. From this 
calculation we have reached to a similar Spectrum-HHI value (Spectrum-HHI = 2147). Thus, our first method 
has been supported by our alternative approach.  
After the data collection process, we have concluded the Table 4.4 below which shows the insight of 
spectrum concentration in the studied mobile markets. Our first observation from this table was India as 
like in market penetration HHI index is located in the end of the list. On the other hand, Australia is in the 
top of the list as Vodafone holds great amount of mobile spectrum (Melbourne 48%, Sydney 51%). 
Table 4.4. Spectrum HHI values for Studied Markets 
 
4.1.4 Reselling Rights 
Telecommunications markets traditionally have been highly regulated by the government institutions.  
Government-owned telecommunications monopolies have dominated the markets for years until the 
liberalization trend in the industry during 1990s. This trend covered the fixed-line monopolies to be 
privatized, mobile networks which have established by private capital. The regulators have issued the 
spectrum licenses with varying methods including lottery, beauty contests, first-come first-served and lately 
most prevalent method auctioning.  Via utilization of auctions as spectrum granting method, market-based 
mechanisms have been embraced to optimally allocate the scarce spectrum resources. However, over the 
time, the optimum utilization of the spectrum should be sustained.  
The regulator himself may intervene the market and relocate some of the spectrum to sustain efficiency. 
However, this method is completely against the market rules. Thus, the utilization of this method can 
create unwanted effects in the market. That is why re-assigning the spectrum via market dynamics would 
create transparency and efficiency in the market. This approach created the idea of reselling the spectrum 
rights. 
During our research, we have gathered the data related to availability of the reselling rights in the studied 
mobile markets. The summarized data set has shown in Table 4.5.   
 
Countries Spectrum HHI value 
Finland  3327 
Chile 2061 
Sweden 2040 
Turkey 3365 
United Kingdom 2822 
China 3344 
Japan 2702 
New Zealand 2558 
Australia 3806 
United States 2181 
India 1900 
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Reselling Rights Not Available Partly Available Available 
Mobile markets Chile, Turkey, China, 
India, Japan 
Finland Sweden, Australia, New 
Zealand, United 
Kingdom,  United States 
Table 4.5. Reselling Rights in the Studied Countries 
 
New Zealand and Australia have utilized liberal approaches in spectrum licensing. New Zealand was the first 
country that utilizes the auctioning method for frequency licensing. The regulator has categorized the 
available spectrum under Management Rights Regime (MRR), Radio License Regime (RLR), General User 
Licenses (GULs) and other licenses. Management Right Regime attracts great attention for being a different 
framework. Under this regime; the licensing rights have been divided under two tiers. The upper tier rights 
give the manager the right to issue the licenses for itself or the others. Also, these upper management 
rights can be aggregated or sub-divided. They are traded on similar systems as private properties and can 
be mortgaged. Management rights holder has the right to utilize the spectrum under interference limits.  
The lower-tier rights can be fully tradable. In Australia; the regulator has categorized the spectrum into four 
categories; apparatus licenses, spectrum licenses, class licenses, broadband and defense licenses. Regulator 
is changing the traditional command-and-control type apparatus licenses to spectrum licenses.  The 
smallest indivisible spectrum piece category has been determined as standard trading unit. The spectrum 
and apparatus licenses may be traded or sub-let but only spectrum licenses can be subdivided or 
aggregated. When the parties agree on a spectrum trade, the parties apply to the regulator for the 
transaction. The regulator does not have the right to veto the transaction where it only enforces a small 
administration transaction fee. During 1998-2004, the number of licenses traded in Australia has shown in 
Table 4.6 below. As the table shows, secondary trading opportunities in Australia are still very limited.  
Year Number of Licenses Trading in 
Australia 1998-2004 
Percentage Turnover Rate 
1998-1999 50 13.8 
1999-2000 33 5.4 
2000-2001 47 7.7 
2001-2002 51 8.4 
2002-2003 54 8.8 
2003-2004 22 3.6 
Total Trades 246 n/a 
Table 4.6. License trading between 1998-2004 in Australia. 
Note: Turnover rate = number of licenses traded each year / total number of spectrum licenses in issue.  
Following New Zealand and Australia, some other countries have started to enable spectrum reselling 
rights to create secondary trading markets such as the United States, United Kingdom and Sweden. Finland 
also has started to make available the reselling rights in some parts of the licenses. China, Turkey, Chile and 
Japan have not implemented reselling rights option yet.    
4.1.5 Technology Neutrality / Harmonization 
In mobile industry, different technology standards have always coexisted from the initiation of the first-
generation mobile networks.As seen in Table 4.7: five incompatible technologies in Europe and overall 
seven different standards in the world have been started to deploy. This fragmented analog mobile 
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telecommunications markets have been replaced by second-generation digital telecommunications 
systems [78].  
 
Technology Standard Countries and Regions Deployed 
Nordic Mobile Telecom (NMT) Nordic Countries, Switzerland, Netherlands, Eastern 
Europe, Russia 
Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) North America and Australia, China 
Total Access Communications Systems (TACS) United Kingdom, China 
C-450 West Germany, Portugal, South Africa 
Radiocom 2000 France 
RTMI Italy 
Japan Total Access Communications System Japan 
Table 4.7.  1G mobile technologies based on geographical area 
During the development of 2G standards, European authorities have noticed the importance of the 
technology harmonization in the continent. Thus, Global System for Mobile (GSM) has born to provide a 
compatible technology in European continent. However, the success become much greater and the 
technology also became popular outside of Europe. In contrast to Europe, United States has not focused  
on development of a single digital mobile technology. Instead of that, American markets have incompatible 
standards namely GSM, CDMA, iDEN (TDMA-based) and D-AMPS. As this two different approach rose in 
different market, it is crucial to investigate what is the drivers of technology standardization and neutrality.  
Harmonizing the technology provides plenty of advantages. First of all, the scale of economics creates great 
impact for the market roll-out. As the technology have already determined, the industry players operate 
their business activities in an environment where market uncertainty is minimized. Then, the firms have the 
ability to align their strategy with the macro-environment fairly easy. Thus, the value creation ecosystems 
have established rapidly. As a result, the products become widely available along with exploiting the cost 
advantage of mass production. Secondly; from the consumer point of view, switching cost from one 
supplier to another decreases as the products are more standardized. Thirdly, the mobile operators may 
utilize infrastructure cooperation between operators which may reduce the costs significantly and move 
the competition from infrastructure-based to service-based competition.   
To exploit the advantages of technology harmonization frameworks, the regulatory authorities can favor a 
technology to be deployed. For instance as we have mentioned, European authorities have developed a 
common in-house technology for provision of digital mobile services (GSM Memorandum of 
Understanding). To force the mobile operators to use this technology, the spectrum licenses may be 
granted with technology specifications.  
As a contrary approach, the regulators may not determine the technology that is deployed in the market. 
Thus, the regulator provide space  for competition between different standards in the market. Even though 
this approach has more market uncertainty initially including slower roll-out, delay of reaching to scale of 
economics and lack of infrastructure sharing opportunities, on the other hand this approach has its own 
advantages. Firstly; if the regulator do not have the capability to choose the best technology standard, 
there is a risk to choose an inferior technology to deploy which may lead to stay whole industry in an 
underdeveloped phase. Thus, letting the market decide decreases the risks on the regulator. Secondly, at 
the present time the interconnection between the technologies is feasible. Thirdly, the mobile operators 
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may have different motivations to create their service portfolio. As the technologies standards differ, the 
capabilities of these standards vary. For instance, one technological standard may be organized to support 
data-services better where the other may be more voice-centric. Therefore, leaving the technology 
selection process to the market let the mobile players to issue flexibility in their revenue-making 
mechanisms.  
During our research, we have observed four types of different market cases with respect to technology 
neutrality / harmonization parameter. In the first scenario, as the regulator chooses the technology 
standard, then the market practices that certain technology standard. The second scenario comprises the 
technology-neutrality from the regulator, and then multiple standards become deployed in the market. 
These technology standards may have varying level of market share. Thirdly; even though the regulator 
becomes neutral in technology selection process, the market can harmonize towards a single standard over 
time. Lastly, initially the regulator may harmonize the technology, it may later abandon this approach. 
However; as the systems have already been deployed, one single technology standard can dominate the 
market. 
 Technology 
Harmonization 
Technology neutrality 
(regulator) and 
technology 
harmonization (market)  
Technology neutrality 
(regulator and market)  
Mobile markets Finland, Turkey, China Chile, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, 
Australia 
Japan, United States, 
India 
 
Table 4.8. Technology Neutrality Parameter in the studied mobile market in respect to regulator and 
market practice perspectives  
China has been a distinctive case with its technology neutrality framework.  Even though the Chinese 
market was a monopoly (China Telecom) during 1987- July 1994, two different technologies namely TACS 
and AMPS have been deployed. While the number of players has increased in Chinese market, the 
existence of multiple standards has continued. As of pre-3G period GSM (also GPRS), CDMA IS-95A 
networks were providing services to the market. Chinese regulator has issued 3G licenses in 2009 with 
specifying different technology standard to each mobile operator. China Mobile, the biggest mobile 
operator in terms of number of subscribers, acquired the home-grown, least desirable standard by 
international standards. However, China endeavors to dominate its home-grown standard in its own 
market, and then expand its technology internationally. This approach is called enveloping strategy in 
strategic management field. 
United States, Japan and India are the markets where different standards exist and practically compete 
against each other.  Japanese mobile giants favored to deploy their home-grown standards in 1G and 2G 
such as PDC and JTACS which increased the  barrier of entry  to Japanese market for the international 
mobile device manufacturers. In a nutshell, these countries have chosen the approach that “let the market 
decide”.   
The regulatory bodies in Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Sweden and UK decided to “give the ball” to the 
market players. In these countries, the market itself becomes harmonized over time. United Kingdom and 
Sweden have dictated the technology standard in the first place. However, British regulator decided to 
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abandon this approach by issuing the new licenses and initiating the revision on the existing licenses in 
respect to technology neutrality. Because of the mobile devices and infrastructure have already deployed, 
the switching costs for both subscribers and mobile operators are relatively high. As the barrier of entry in 
the telecommunications industry is quite high after market saturation, investment for switching to another 
technology does not seem very feasible. However in the future  deployment of a secondary technology may 
become feasible.  
Finnish regulator has enabled the technology neutrality only in the last spectrum assignment. Turkey has 
not made any official claim in this issue yet.   
4.1.6 Service Neutrality / Harmonization 
As the regulatory bodies may specify the technologies which are deployed in specific spectrum bands, the 
regulators may also dictate the services that will be provided on spectrum bands. If the regulator decides to 
utilize this method, the services on those specific bands become harmonized by the regulator. For instance, 
the auction in New Zealand to release the necessary spectrum for 3G services have issued the licenses in 
service neutrality framework. Therefore, this auction cannot be called as 3G licenses where the other 
players might enter the spectrum to utilize those bandwidths for completely different services than 3G 
services.  However, in practice at the moment this spectrum range is utilized only for mobile services.  In 
contrast to this approach, the regulators may define the frequency spectrum for a specific service such as 
“mobile spectrum”.  
During our analysis in the studied mobile markets, we have identified service neutrality as a potential 
parameter which may describe us the spectrum policy framework of the regulatory body in that country. 
Even though the regulatory bodies may issue the licenses under service neutrality, in practical terms it 
might be harder for other industry players to enter the auction and pay a great deal of money to acquire 
the spectrum.  Thus, the regulatory decisions may not affect the spectrum utilization in this sense.  
We have thought that digital dividend might be a topic that should be discussed in a sense under service 
neutrality / harmonization framework. Even though, the regulatory bodies have commonly started not to 
define technology or service in the latest auctions, still the digital dividend and spectrum refarming prove 
contrary approaches. Digital dividend aims to utilize the analog TV spectrum for mobile services.  The 
regulators give notice for expiration dates of analog TV licenses and then make decisions to assign these 
licenses for other purposes. Even though these frequencies (700 MHz-800 MHz frequency bands depending 
on the country) may be auctioned under service neutrality, it is a common fact that the reason for the 
switchover is to utilize this frequency band for mobile services.  Furthermore, the spectrum refarming 
policies may include various effects in spectrum neutrality framework. As a positive correlation with the 
framework, the spectrum refarming allows the revision of the legacy spectrum assignments under 
technology and service harmonization perspective to reassign with technology and service neutrality. In 
contrast, the regulator may reorganize the spectrum band during the spectrum refarming. For instance, 
some spectrum bands may have discontinuous spectrum ranges for each operator. Thus, the regulators 
may convert the licenses to reorganize the band to provide mobile operators continuous bandwidth. 
However, the regulator may issue smaller or larger spectrum fraction which may affect the level of utility of 
a technology. Thus, the bands may be organized in a way, which favor a specific technology and eventually 
a service.  As technology neutrality determines the service neutrality framework, we have dropped the 
service neutrality from being a potential explaining factor along with boosting technology neutrality 
framework. 
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4.2 Market Structure Analysis 
In this section, we will review the market structure parameters which are located in the y-axis of the phase 
diagram for mobile market regulations. Firstly, we will introduce the existence of multinational operators in  
the studied mobile markets. Then in an order we will go through the parameters; investments, mobile 
prices, infrastructure sharing, ARPU, prepaid / postpaid ratio, mobile network portability (MNP), churn rate 
and industry unbundling. Hence, we will examine these parameters in the studied countries finally to reach 
the openness of mobile telecommunications industry.  
4.2.1 Existence of Multinational Mobile Operators  
Even though the regulators have decided to open up the mobile industries to the private sector in 1990s, 
still the market players have been determined under the great power of the regulators. The regulators use 
the spectrum assignment methods as a tool to specify the characteristics of the market players. For 
instance, the regulator may follow a framework to issue the spectrum licenses only to the firms which are 
funded by the national equity. This approach considers the telecommunications industry as a critical 
importance for national security. Thus, this market structure is only one step forward than the state-owned 
monopolies. Besides, the regulator may act in a more liberal manner allowing direct foreign investment in 
its mobile market. Firstly, the regulator may allow the mobile operators which have foreign investment up 
to certain level to operate in the market (such as 50% as a threshold). Joint ventures may be involved to 
this category. Furthermore, the regulator may permit mobile operators which are completely based on 
foreign direct investment.  
Even though, the regulator allows the foreign investment in the telecommunications industry, still the 
industry in the country should be attractive for the foreign investors to enter to the market. To assess the 
attractiveness of the industry for a foreign entity, we may use PESTEL analysis which explains the macro 
level environment. PESTEL analysis take into account macro level assessments with respect to political, 
economical, social, technological, environmental and legal factors. The political factors comprise the level 
of government intervention, political stability, tax policy, tariff regulations. The firms would prefer to 
constitute their businesses in less bureaucratic markets. Economic factors include the economic growth, 
exchange rates, inflation and interest rates. As the foreign investment is mostly looking for new areas to 
make its business more profitable, the economic situation of the new potential market is crucial to reach 
this target. Social factors implicate the cultural aspects, social behavior and population structure. Due to 
offerings are provided to the new customers, the firm should be certain about the match between the 
customer expectation and the firm offer. Thus in this way the firm is able to maximize the value of its 
offering when the customer utility has been improved. Technology aspects become crucial in telecom 
market in respect to the implementation of technological change and incentives. Environmental factors 
may include weather conditions which affect the operating conditions of the mobile infrastructure and 
devices. For instance, in the winter months, Finland may experience -25 degrees where in the summer 
temperatures rise up to +30. Thus, the companies should sustain the operability of the services in both 
extreme conditions. Legal factors comprise consumer laws, employment laws and antitrust laws.  
If the conditions for a foreign entry are favorable, then the foreign entrant may observe the target market 
as a potential to make business. By entering the new market, the foreign company becomes multinational 
company structure. Thus the company may increase its overall profitability by leveraging on industry 
expertise and economies of scale. Moreover, the company may diversify the revenue streams by possessing 
operations in different markets. As we have explained the situation from the firm perspective, now we can 
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discuss rise a question from the different point of view: What are the advantages of a multinational mobile 
operator doing business in the market from the host market point of view.  
A multinational operator in the market may create positive influence on the market. The foreign entrance 
to the market brings direct investment along with raise in employment and income level of the sector.  The 
multinational company utilizes its managerial expertise and technological capabilities to leverage in the 
market. Thus, the entrance may break the protectionism and create competition among domestic 
companies. Thus, the domestic rivals have to increase their efficiencies to stay competitive in the market.  
Also, domestic rivals get the opportunity to utilize the R&D outcomes of the foreign entrant. Thus, whole 
industry may evolve in significant degree by a foreign entrant. 
During our research, we would like to investigate whether the multinational companies operate in the 
studied markets. Thus, we have involved the activities of the multinational mobile operators to our study.  
We have summarized the availability of multinational operators in the studied market in Table 4.9 below. 
TeliaSonera, which is in a dominant mobile operator in Sweden and Finland, is a merger company between 
Finnish Sonera and Swedish Telia telecommunications companies. Beyond Finnish and Swedish markets, 
the company has operations in other markets including owning companies (Eesti Telekom in Estonia, 
Omnitel in Baltics) and shares in many markets including LMT in Latvia, Turkcell in Turkey and MegaFon in 
Russia. In Chilean mobile market, Telefonica and Claro are the multinational ventures operating in the 
market. Telefonica Group was initially telecommunications monopoly in Spain. Over years, company has 
expanded its operations to United States, Germany, United Kingdom and Latin America. America Movil has 
operations in United States and Latin America where the company operates under Claro brand in Chile.  
Vodafone is the second biggest mobile network operator in the world(following China Mobile) in terms of 
revenues and number of subscribers. In the studied mobile markets, Vodafone has  operations in United 
Kingdom, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, India, United Stated (via Verizon 45% owned). In British market in 
addition to Vodafone, Everything Everywhere (EE), which operates in the UK market, is created by the 
merge of British ventures of Deutsche Telecom and France Telecom. T-Mobile also have operations in 
United States and Europe.  Thus, our research has shown that except Japan and China, all the studied 
mobile markets have foreign entrants to their mobile markets.  
Countries Available: Yes /No Name 
Finland Yes,  TeliaSonera 
Chile Yes, Telefonica, Claro (America Movil) 
Sweden Yes, TeliaSonera 
Turkey Yes, Vodafone  
United Kingdom Yes, Vodafone, EE 
China No 
India Yes, Vodafone 
New Zealand Yes, Vodafone 
Australia Yes, Vodafone 
United States Yes, T-Mobile, Vodafone 
Japan  No 
Table 4.9. Existence of multinational mobile operators in studied markets.  
Chinese government has put licensing barrier for the private enterprises to enter the mobile market in the 
country. Currently, three mobile operators are available in Chinese market. All of these players determined 
via comparative bidding and they all belong to state-owned companies. Even though in Japan, there are not 
many restrictions for multinational operators, still Japanese market has been dominated by the national 
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players. High switching costs due to walled garden industry structure , incompatible technology standards, 
strength of local mobile operators might decrease the enthusiasm of the foreign investment to the 
Japanese mobile telecommunications industry. 
4.2.2 Investments 
Investments constitute a key parameter as they represent a major strategic decision regarding the  target 
to rise the company`s capital stock and long run expansion in terms of size of the business. This success 
target is driven by multiple factors. First of all, the company may take advantage of higher expected profits 
from expanding output and meeting a rise in consumer demand. As the company becomes capable of 
serving larger group of customers, the productive capacity and market base increase.  Thus, the company 
may exploit economics of scale which thereby reduces the long term average-cost structure. Also, the 
company may redesign its production processes through technological progress which provides efficiency 
and superior end products.  These factors force the potential new entrants out of market due to the high 
level of investment requirement for them to acquire the same level of market expertise with the existing 
firms.   
Mobile telecommunications industry requires persistently high amount of investment due to the market 
demand and technological evolution. Market demand is triggered in distinct manners in different markets. 
The main driver for the demand in the emerging market has been the rise in number of subscribers as the 
mobile services become accessible for larger masses., Even though in mature markets the number of 
subscribers is quite stable, the amount of usage has increased significantly. Secondly, mobile technology 
develops dynamically. After first GSM call made in Finland, in 20 years the mobile technology evolved from 
second generation to fourth generation. Thus, the deployment of new systems and equipments drive the 
capital expenditure notably.  
In the recent years, mobile networks have seen radical changes based on technological innovation, strong 
competitive environment and high demand from the customers. During 2009-2012 time frame, some of the 
mobile operators even seen 8000 percent growth on their networks. Responding this demand necessities 
investment on the networks and systems.  The estimations show that in next ten years 1 trillion dollar 
investment is required to pace with the demand. Based on Tellabs´s research [79], it is predicted that 
mobile operators will face capacity crunch by 2017. The capacity crunch is predicted to reach 9.2 billion 
dollar global backhaul gap with a 16 petabyte shortfall. The capacity crunch based on regions is shown in 
Table 4.10 below. 
Region Investment shortfall Capacity shortfall 
Asia Pacific $5.3 billion 9.4 Petabytes 
Middle East Africa US$1 billion 1.8 Petabytes 
Western Europe US$1 billion 1.8 Petabytes 
North America US$650 million 1.2 Petabytes 
Caribbean/Latin America US$600 million 1.1 Petabytes 
Central & Eastern Europe US$580 million 1 Petabyte 
Table 4.10. Investment and capacity shortfalls vary by region (calculated as necessary backhaul expenditure 
minus current planned operator investment): 
Due to the expected capacity crunch, mobile operators should optimize their investments to guarantee the 
quality of their services.  The rise in mobile traffic demand and deployment of 4G technology will fierce the 
amount of investments. Traffic demand requires network upgrades along with improving efficiency of 
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legacy deployments. Moving to 4G requires investments in radio access network and backhaul.  Naturally, 
the mobile operators expect revenue growth as they accomplish these investments. However, there are 
some factors which reduce the level of return from these investments. Firstly, even though LTE systems are 
much simpler having lower operational costs, at the present time mobile operators should operate their 4G 
networks along with legacy platforms to support current services and customers. Hence, the co-existence 
of multiple platforms drives the costs significantly. To reduce these costs, mobile operators should 
advertise and give radical incentives to their customers to move to LTE networks for reducing the operating 
costs of legacy platforms.  Secondly, mobile operators may outsource the services which do not provide 
competitive advantage to them in the market. In this way, the operational costs -such as inventory data 
management, data management, network engineering- reduce significantly.  
As the differentiation factor in the mobile business is moving from network to the services domain, there is 
an opportunity for mobile operators to increase the level of infrastructure sharing and meanwhile focusing 
on mobile services.  Mobile operators establish marketplace differentiation by offering new customer value 
propositions. Thus, operators may provide diverse portfolio of products and services which may diverse 
their revenue sources.  
Since the mobile operators invest to their networks and services, they may reach better financial 
performance. First of all, the customer loyalty is improved as 40% of the mobile users listed the poor 
network performance as a reason to leave the mobile operator. Hence, sufficient investment in backhaul 
could reduce the churn rate from 4% to 7%.  Revenue lost to customer churn is forecasted as 4 times higher 
than the backhaul investment required the customer demand. Besides, operating margins may be 
improved up to 5% if backhaul investment increases to meet traffic growth.  
As we have discussed the importance of the investment in company level, right now we can direct our 
attention to the importance of the investments in industry level. As the individual players increase the level 
of investments to enhance their capabilities, the overall level of investment in the industry proportionally 
increases. Thus, the level of accumulated expertise in the industry creates higher revenues and contribution 
to the economy. With good expertise and financial resources, the industry may expand its operations to 
other markets. Thus, the multinational (or global) firms arise. We can assess multi-national operators under 
this category. Vodafone`s superior know-how has enabled to sustain successful operations in many 
markets.  The mobile expertise in Nordic countries created global mobile players; Nokia and Ericsson. 
In the context of our research, we have thought that the investment data in the studied countries may give 
insight about the mobile market structure [80]. Thus, we collected the relevant data via desktop search 
from OECD report, regulator, mobile operator, and news websites.  Through our search, the investment 
information was one of the hardest parameter to obtain and validate.. Because in some markets such as 
Japan and Australia, mobile operators are horizontally integrated where they provide mobile services as 
well as fixed line services along with broadband services. Thus, they may not publish separate capital 
expenditure values for their mobile and fixed-line business segments. Additionally as we study in broad 
range of mobile markets, availability of the data for the same time period in all of the studied markets has 
risen as a crucial problem. To overcome this issue, we have focused on having the most up-to-date 
available data for the mobile markets to visualize the present level of investments in the mobile markets. 
When we revise the markets, we have noticed that the markets may be in different stages of the 
deployment of network platforms as the mobile markets are in the different phase to transition to 3G and 
4G platforms. Hence, this approach has also supported our idea to utilize most up-to-date data in the 
mobile network investment. Lastly, we have excluded spectrum fees out of investment parameter to reach 
pure capital expenditure value.  
As we have collected relevant investment data in our research, firstly we have started to form Table 4.11 
below. In this table, we have summarized the amount of mobile network investment in the studied 
countries. To standardize the data, we have determined euro as the currency. Thus, we have converted 
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other currencies based on up-to-date exchange rates (1 dollar = 0. 76 euro, 1 Australian dollar = 0. 78 euro, 
1 Chinese yuan = 0.12 euro). Also, the table includes investment data from 2013 (2 markets),  2011 (3 
markets), 2009 (3 markets), 2007 (1 market) and lastly Japan where the data set is taken from 2011 and 
2012 values.   
Mobile Market Investment in Mobile Networks 
(million euros) 
Date of the data  
Finland 220  2011 
Chile 1069  2011 
Sweden 362 2007 
Turkey 1061  2011 
United Kingdom 1857  2009 
China  22 252 2009 
India 8990  2013 
New Zealand 167  2007 
Australia 1370 2013 
United States  15 694 2009 
Japan  12 502 Softbank  2011, DoCoMo 2012, 
KDDI 2012 
Table 4.11. The level of mobile investment on mobile networks in the studied markets.  
Following the completion of the gathering of the investment data, the next question is raised regarding the 
utilization of this data set. As the countries are not in the same scale in respect to population, it is hard to 
say something concrete after reviewing investment values of two different markets such as New Zealand 
and China as they possess completely different population structure. Hence, the necessity of correction of 
this data set with other parameters becomes clear to enable robust comparison between the mobile 
markets.   
In order to provide reliable comparison, we have examined the population and mobile subscription ratio of 
the studied markets. Even though the population as a parameter shows the overall size of a country 
accordingly its mobile market, combining population with the mobile penetration ratio provides more 
certain data about the scale of the mobile market due to the huge difference in subscription level between 
countries. For instance, Finland tops in the studied mobile markets with the 171% mobile penetration 
where India is in the end of the list with 73% of the mobile subscription.  This variance demonstrates the 
importance of including subscription ratio as a supporting parameter.  
In Table 4.12 below, we have combined the level of investment with population and mobile subscription 
ratio. Thus, the resulted value investment per subscription has formed dividing of investment values with 
multiplication of population and mobile subscription ratio.  
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Countries Investment / Subscriptions (Euros) Updated in  
Finland 23,8  2011 
Chile 49,8  2011 
Sweden 26,13  2007 
Turkey 15,9  2011 
 
United Kingdom 23,9  2009 
China 20.2  2009 
India 10,1  2013 
New Zealand 35,08  2007 
Australia 57  2013 
United States 48,4  2009 
Japan  96 2011, 2012 
Table 4.12.  The investment level per subscriber in the studied markets.  
As seen in Table 4.12, Japan has positioned in the top of the list with 96 euros investment, followed by Chile 
and Australia. On the other hand, India, Turkey and China have been located in the bottom list.  Even 
investment value may change from year to year or just with variations in exchange rates, it is accounted as 
an important parameter as it holds many different factors in its contexture.  
4.2.3 Mobile Prices 
Pricing is the process of determining the amount of revenue that company receives for the exchange of its 
products or services. Therefore, it is a crucial parameter that affects the demand and the revenues earned.  
Considering different industries and diverse products and services, we may clearly see variations in pricing 
strategies. To comprehend pricing strategies, we may categorize these different product and service 
portfolios into two groups: Private and public goods. In private good context, the good or service is 
depleted as it has consumed.  The consumed product or service is exclusive, as it cannot be consumed 
twice. Each produced product or service possesses a cost item. In the ideal market conditions, the price of 
private goods becomes equal to the marginal cost. In public good context, the product or service is not 
depleted as it is consumed. Nondepletable products or services are nonexclusive as different users may 
utilize it. In this sense public goods do not contain any unit cost. Hence, the marginal cost in this category 
converges to zero.  If the price is adjusted based on the cost like in private goods, the price should also 
converge to marginal cost. However this is not possible as fixed costs should be covered to utilize the 
resources. Thus, taxation and non-usage based pricing schemes are preferred in public goods.  
Being one of the marketing mix elements put pricing such an important strategic place due to its great 
influence on positioning of the products. Even though different products or services demand various 
approaches, there are common objectives to determine the optimal pricing. Optimal pricing strategy should 
boost profit and revenue maximization with an adequate profit margin. Additionally, the pricing strategy 
should create sustainable customer base along with quality aspiration. In crises situations, the temporary 
pricing objective may turn to survival in the market.  
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Mobile operators provide broad range of products and services to their subscribers. Due to the variance of 
the nature of the offerings, the operators have embraced different pricing schemes. For instance, 
telephone calls on the GSM networks may be evaluated as private good as each call occupies specific 
channel. Due to the existence of marginal cost, telephone calls might be charged by price / unit principle.    
In contrast to traditional calls, VoIP calls are based on IP service. Combination of IP-based service with 
cheapened CPUs and memories drive the marginal cost for new subscribers to zero. Thus, flat-rate pricing 
scheme becomes suitable for VoIP pricing. Best-effort IP services were initially thought as public good 
which leaded to utilize flat rate pricing.  When the total usage of the network increases, congestions may 
happen in the mobile network. Congestion factor adds private good externality to the best-offer IP services. 
Thus, in the future pricing scheme for these services might move to block pricing. Digital content has 
private and public good externalities due to copyrights and convergence of marginal costs to zero.  
When we have researched the level for the mobile prices in the studied markets, there were various 
approaches to create the parameter. One approach was utilizing the price of a basic service and then 
making assumption about that service represents the overall price level in its market.  Second approach 
would be creating a basket that includes certain amount of different services and then executing 
comparison between the studied markets based on this data. This approach has weaknesses as the selected 
markets in this study possess large variances in the usage characteristics of different mobile services. The 
second difficulty on this approach is the lack of available data on creating the basket as the mobile 
operators provide different offerings to their customers along with long-term contracts and device subsidy. 
Due to these reasons, we have selected to utilize the first approach to analyze the pricing level in the 
studied markets. Even though the importance of mobile data increases, at the present time mobile 
operators obtain most of their revenues based on voice services. Based on this, we have utilized purchasing 
power parity adjusted mobile voice tariff to compare the mobile prices in the studied markets. We have 
summarized the data set in Table 4.13 below.  
Countries Mobile Voice Tariff (PPP $/min) 
Finland 0,07 
Chile 0,29 
Sweden 0,08 
Turkey 0,40 
United Kingdom 0,31 
China 0,15 
India 0,06 
New Zealand 0,55 
Australia 0,64 
United States 0,25 
Japan  0,81 
Table 4.13. Mobile Cellular Tariffs in Studied Markets PPP $/min. 
As seen from the Table 4.13, India has the lowest mobile prices followed by Finland and Sweden.  Indian 
mobile market has been fragmented between many regional players. Finnish and Swedish mobile markets 
are very developed due to accumulated expertise in these countries. Also, we know that Finnish regulator 
has led the prices to marginal costs with its policies in the mobile market.  Japanese mobile market 
possesses the highest prices in the studied markets. As the Japanese mobile operators employ different 
technological standards along with widespread handset bundling increases the switching costs in subscriber 
point of view. Hence, the mobile operators are able to charge higher prices to the subscribers.  
4.2.4 Infrastructure Sharing  
The regulators may request national coverage obligations from mobile operators by deployment of the 
mobile infrastructure to large geographical areas, especially in beauty contest cases. Each phase of this 
 
 
40 
process: procurement, deployment and operations require the use of big amount of financial resources.  
Hence, the operator should optimize these deployed resources to reach superior financial performance. In 
some areas the network is not used optimally due to sparse subscriber base or irregular traffic demand. 
Improving the level of network utilizations provides significant cost savings to the mobile operators. Cost 
saving advantages pushes mobile operators and regulators to boast the infrastructure sharing mechanisms. 
During our research, we have commonly come across that regulators give incentives for such infrastructure 
sharing. Such as Swedish regulator has put coverage obligation during the 3G-spectrum assignment 
process. So that, Swedish mobile operator can fulfill this obligation via roaming to another network in 
certain level.  Also in Sweden, there are joint ventures by the mobile operators to provide mobile services. 
However, it is hard to proof that infrastructure sharing is commonly practiced in all studied countries. For 
instance, in Turkey there was a trial to operate base stations via outsourcing and sharing the operational 
costs. Due to the idea of protecting the competitive advantage in-house, the market players have not 
embraced this approach.  
During the research process, we have noticed that it is hard to differentiate the level of infrastructure 
sharing practiced in the studied countries. Permission or recommendation of the regulator is not adequate 
information to reflect the real situation ongoing in the market. Additionally, the conditions of infrastructure 
sharing agreements may not be publicly available. Due to this reasons, we have concluded that 
infrastructure sharing as a parameter is not very transparent and certain. Thus, infrastructure sharing is 
eliminated from being an explaining factor.  
Even though we do not have enough data to process infrastructure sharing as a parameter, it will become 
more and more import in the near future. Since the congestions in the network become more probable as 
the data services drive up, the need for offloading of mobile traffic to other networks including WLAN and 
fixed networks will become more feasible. In this way, infrastructure sharing with other communications 
service providers will be operable. Thus, the mobile operators may overcome the capacity problem in 
certain conditions.  
4.2.5 Average Revenue per User 
Average Revenue per User or shortly ARPU is a finance-related parameter that analyzes revenue generation 
per subscriber level. ARPU provides a way of tracking the revenue growth as a result of promotions and 
supplemental services. In this way, investors may identify the revenue generation potential of certain 
products or services. As shown in Equation 4.3, along with number of subscribers, ARPU is a key factor in 
company revenues.  
Total Revenue = ARPU X Number of Subscribers     (Equation 4.3) 
ARPU is commonly utilized by telecommunications and internet companies to analyze their revenue 
performance.  In this way, the mobile operators are able to assess their relative performance among the 
competitors` performances. In principle, mobile operators would like to create products or services which 
increase their ARPU level at the same time  avoiding the actions which may result lower ARPU. However, 
recently mobile operators has raised permanent decline in their revenue streams.  
Even though ARPU is a widely-used parameter that is officially announced by regulators and mobile 
operators, there may be some variations in calculation methods. Ideally, ARPU should be calculated as 
division of revenues by the number of user that contributes the revenue stream during the calculated 
period.  However in some situations, it is calculated based on the subscribers in the beginning or end of the 
period. Even the average of subscribers in the beginning and end of the calculated period is utilized to 
reach the final number of subscribers. Furthermore, the revenues which originate other than subscribers 
may lead misunderstandings in the assessment of revenue generation. Lastly even though the collected 
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mobile termination rates will be shared between the players, it is still included in total amount of revenues.   
 In mobile markets, ARPU level may be correlated to the market development. For instance, increasing the 
subscriber base in emerging markets like India adds new subscribers mostly from rural areas. As this group 
of subscribers in general has more limited budget and less tend to use data oriented services, declining in 
the ARPU value is expected. However, decline in the ARPU level does not indicate diminishing of revenues 
during that time period. In this case, it would be beneficial to calculate separate ARPU values for different 
subscriber groups to visualize the separate business performance. Because the business approach for these 
groups may be completely different. Boosting high-end subscriber base requires high retention and 
subscriber acquisition costs, network upgrades due to high usage of services. In contrast, even though low-
end subscribers create lower amount of revenue, they may generate satisfactory profit margin due to low 
level of investment.  
In developed mobile markets, the mobile penetration may exceed the national population. Thus, the actual 
subscription user may be lower than the number of connections as one user has multiple subscriptions. 
Thus, the mobile usage may be fragmented between different providers. In this case, assumptions on 
amount of this type of subscribers may give the actual potential of the mobile products and services.  
During investigation of ARPU parameter, we have preferred the use of OECD statistics as a trustable source. 
The latest ARPU statistics published by OECD possess updated data from 2009.  In China, we have 
concluded the ARPU value as the mean of separate mobile operator ARPU values weighted on number of 
subscribers [81]. In Indian case, we have used press analysis as a source [82]. Compiled data is summarized 
in Table 4.14 below.  
Mobile Markets Monthly ARPU ($) Updated in  
Finland 32 2009 
Chile 16,36 2011 
Sweden 18 2009 
Turkey  11 2009 
United Kingdom 17 2009 
China  9.82 2012 
India 1.6 2012 
New Zealand 21 2009 
Australia 48 2009 
United States 47  2009 
Japan 84 2009 
Table 4.14. Monthly average revenue per user value in the studied countries. 
As seen from Table 4.14, the highest ARPU has seen in Japan, Australia and United States. As Japanese 
mobile communications services are very developed and the prices and the level of investment are highest 
in the studied markets, the leadership of Japan in this list is very much expected. New Zealand which was in 
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top three in mobile pricing has relatively lower ARPU value. This relation indicates the lower usage of 
services as New Zealanders still consume fixed line services in a considerable amount. In the bottom of the 
ARPU list, India and China are located. As the adoption of the mobile service become affordable for large 
masses mostly in the rural areas, ARPU level decreases. However, in the long term these markets may 
possess great potential.  
4.2.6 Prepaid / Postpaid Market Composition 
Mobile operators may provide their mobile services under prepaid or postpaid subscription engagements. 
In prepaid subscriptions, the users purchase the credits in advance where in postpaid subscription the users 
receive a bill at the end of each month. As the key payment condition differs, the dynamics of the 
engagement with the subscribers change.  
Initially, prepaid subscribers have been viewed as inferior customer group due to lower ARPU value 
comparing to postpaid subscribers. However, prepaid subscriptions include more young people in the 
customer base who tend to adopt new product and services very fast. Postpaid tariff plans are usually very 
complex including diverse parameters like monthly charge, rental device and taxes. In contrast prepaid 
tariffs follow much simple pricing schemes. Prepaid services may be more expensive due to lack of monthly 
charge which postpaid subscriptions have.  
 Table 4.15 Percentage of prepaid subscriptions in the studied countries. 
 
From an operator´s point of view, prepaid subscriptions have positive and negative business features. To 
start from the positive sides, firstly the operator collects the bill in advance.  Collecting the bill before actual 
usage removes any credit risk along with giving mobile operator the ability to invest between the payment 
Countries Prepaid Ratio  (%) Updated in  
Finland 13  2011 
Chile 71  2011 
Sweden 31  2011 
Turkey 63  2011 
United Kingdom 50  2011 
China 87  2010 
India 95  2011 
New Zealand 66  2011 
Australia 38,3  2011 
United States 25  2012 
Japan  2,0  2007 
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and actual usage. Also, there are customers who will never use their whole balance. These features may set 
the cash transactions more preferable over credit transactions. On the other hand, there are also 
disadvantages in prepaid subscriptions. First of all, the customer loyalty is hard to maintain. Traditionally 
prepaid subscribers have less commitment comparing to postpaid subscribers. Thus, churn rates in the 
prepaid subscriptions are relatively higher. Furthermore, anonymity of the subscribers hardens to visualize 
the users’ motive along with creating a space for the criminals. Apart from postpaid services, prepaid 
services require real-time charging systems to respond the change in the balance without any delay.  
We have summarized prepaid /postpaid market composition in the studied markets in Table 4.15. Based on 
that, the markets which are dominated by prepaid subscribers are India, China, Chile, New Zealand and 
Turkey. On the other hand in Japan, Finland, Sweden, United States and Australia postpaid subscriptions 
are more common. Prepaid/Postpaid market composition has a great effect on switching costs. Especially, 
the churn rate and device bundling opportunities are related to subscription type.  
4.2.7 Mobile Number Portability 
Mobile number portability (MNP) allows the subscribers to retain their mobile phone numbers while 
switching from one mobile operator to another. In this way, subscribers who are not satisfied with the 
services of their mobile operator may change to another mobile operator while keeping the ownership of 
their mobile number. This feature makes a difference as subscribers are reluctant to change their numbers 
due to difficulties in keeping the contact lists such as friends or clients. Moreover, some subscribers may 
feel loyalty to their own number as a result of long-term engagement. In mobile operator point of view, 
there are contrary approaches available about mobile number portability. Some operators in particular the 
big ones in terms of number of subscribers argue the overhead during the implementation of the MNP 
framework. In contrast, the rest claims that MNP provides more fair competition environment based on 
price and service due to lower lock-in mechanisms.  Even though, industry players have different ideas 
about the mobile number portability, the real decision-maker in this topic is regulatory authorities due to 
necessity of legislation.  
If the market is dynamic enough, MNP may lead to price competition between the mobile operators. The 
price competition brings the improvement in quality of services along with presentation of attractive 
products to the subscribers. Also, many services can be provided for free of charge via bundling of services.  
In spite of the advantages, the subscribers should pay attention to possible porting fees and porting period 
as these parameters vary from country to country. 
Mobile operators may take advantage from implementation of number portability. As the subscribers tend 
to change more often, mobile operators should be more competitive to sustain their customer base. To be 
competitive in the market, mobile operators may improve their product line and services. In this way, 
better quality of service arises which may contribute significantly to the mobile operator in the long term.  
Creating better and innovative products and services may require corporate restructuring to build 
competitive advantage in certain areas. Such as new locking tools can be invented such as more 
personalized customer service or special data services which attaches the subscribers tightly. Additionally, 
as MNP lowers the switching costs, mobile operators may choose to build  strategy on cost ownership or 
service  differentiation. 
Data collection on availability of MNP showed that in studied countries number portability is commonly 
practiced. Except China, in rest of the studied countries have regulations or laws regarding the permission 
of portability. However, timing of MNP varies significantly. To show this variance, we have prepared a table 
in Appendix  D  regarding the date of issue of MNP related laws or regulations.  
As the MNP is practiced in 10 over 11 studied market, we have noticed that it is not a main differentiator 
parameter to assess the mobile markets. Thus, we have dropped this parameter being potential explaining 
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factor for market structure. However, we closely know that MNP closely affects the churn rates in the 
market. Churn rate will be discussed in the next section.  
4.2.8 Churn Rate 
Customer relationship management constitutes a critical task in mobile operator business.  Mobile 
operators pay great attention to customer retention to protect its customer base. Customer retention has a 
strong impact on customer life cycle and understanding the level of customer engagement. In mobile 
industry, it is a known fact that acquiring a new customer is much more costly than retention the existing 
customers.   
In mobile operator business, churn rate is closely linked to switching costs. Churn rate is defined as the 
percentage of subscribers who leave the mobile operator during a determined period of time. The 
elements which boosts churn rate are customer dissatisfaction, ineffective customer life cycle 
management, better or cheaper products or services provided by competitors, more successful marketing 
campaigns by the competitors.  To minimize the churn rate, mobile operators put the switching costs 
higher for the subscribers. Thus, higher switching costs directly affect the level of churn rate in the mobile 
market. .   
We have summarized the monthly churn rate data in the studied countries in Table 4.16 below. Based on 
the table, India has clearly very high churn rates as the market predominantly prepaid subscribers and high 
number of MNOs operating in the market. Combining low switching costs with the existence of many 
alternative operators in the market boost the churn rate significantly. On the other hand, Japan has the 
lowest churn rate as the switching costs are traditionally very high due  to widespread of device bundling, 
SIM locking and existence of incompatible technological standards.   
 
Countries Monthly churn rate  (%) Updated in 
Finland 1.20 2008 
Chile 1.50 2012 
Sweden 1.10 2008 
Turkey 3.38 2012 
United Kingdom 2.9 2009 
China 3.5  2011 
India 6 2012 
New Zealand 0.83 2012 
Australia 1.8 2012 
United States 1.10  2012 
Japan  0.62 2011 
Table 4.16. Monthly churn rate in the studied countries. 
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4.2.9 Industry Unbundling 
Companies may expand their business to different segment of production path to exert greater value or to 
enhance their competitive advantage. If this industry bundling form comprises holding the longer part of 
the supply chain, it is called “vertical integration”. Vertical integration may provide cost cuts, superior 
efficiency and reduction of turnaround time. However, sometimes it is much more preferable to outsource 
some of the value chain to rely on exploitation of greater expertise and economies of scale of other 
companies. This move is called vertical disintegration. If the outsourced part of the value chain is not 
providing competitive advantage for the production process, vertical disintegration becomes much more 
attractive.     
As the number of mobile operators in the market is limited due to the oligopolistic market structure, 
enhancing the competition and efficiency level of the market players become crucial. Thus, consumers may 
benefit from increased market competition such as lower prices along with higher service quality. From 
supplier point of view, mobile operators may develop their internal efficiencies to provide their services. 
However, what is the effect of industry unbundling to increase competition and efficiency? 
Mobile industry unbundling divides the mobile operator business into different segments. Thus, different 
players arise such as network operator, service operator and brand operator. Mobile operators may 
concentrate their services in a determined part of the mobile service. Network operators concentrate on 
the deployment of radio access networks and systems to provide the physical coverage for the services. 
Service operators utilize the services from network operator and sell them to the subscribers via 
appropriate business approaches. Unlike service operators, brand operators may not have its own 
customer service. Thus, the brand operators may focus to serve to certain customer groups under the 
exclusive brand.  
Traditionally, telecommunications industry has been vertically integrated. For instance, in general the fixed 
network operators possess the ownership of the whole value chain. Thus, the entrance barrier to this 
business is extremely high. In mobile telecommunications side, the regulators may enforce laws which 
force the mobile operators to unbundle their operations to reduce the entrance barriers. In this way, brand 
and service operators may come to the play.  
Our investigation on unbundling regulations in the mobile industry shows that neither bundling nor 
unbundling framework is in the dominant position. In Table 4.17, you may review the existence situation of 
mobile unbundling regulations in the studied mobile markets. Five of the studied markets have mobile 
network unbundling regulations to split the network operator and service operator. On the other hand, the 
rest of the six mobile markets do not possess any regulations to unbundle the value chain. Thus, these 
markets give the ball to the market about creating different efficiencies in the value chain.  
Network Operator / 
Service Operator 
Separation 
Yes No 
Mobile markets Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Australia 
Chile, Turkey, China, India, 
United States, Japan 
Table 4.17. Implementation of Network Operator / Service Operator separation in the studied markets. 
Even tough there is no clear trend about existence of mobile unbundling regulations; MVNOs are available 
in all of the studied markets except China. Hence, we may say that even though the regulator would like to 
have new entrants in the markets, not all the regulators dictate the unbundling of the mobile value chain.  
With the existence of the MVNOs, especially the needs of niche market are satisfied.  Below in Table 4.18., 
you may review the existence of MVNOs in the market. However, there is not publicly available data about 
the mobile market penetration of MVNOs in every studied mobile market. 
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Availability of MVNOs in 
the market 
Yes No 
Mobile markets Finland, Turkey, Chile, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States, New Zealand, 
Australia, India, Japan 
China 
Table 4.18. The availability of MVNOs in the studied markets. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we present the results of this research study and our recommendation for further research. 
5.1. Results 
In this chapter, we will evaluate spectrum policy and market structure parameters placed in phase diagram 
for mobile telecom regulation.  The evaluation on the parameters will accomplish to determine the 
explaining factors which reflect the insight of the mobile market parameters. With the utilization of the 
explaining factors, we will be able to make comparative analysis on the case mobile markets. We discuss all 
the results proceeding from the previous academic studies as well as our own analysis in this study. 
To begin with, we will analyze the parameters regarding to spectrum policy to finalize with the relevant 
explaining factor. The spectrum policy parameters, which we will evaluate, are market share composition, 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), reselling rights, technology and service neutrality / harmonization 
characteristics.Here, the explaining factor should bring out the spectrum policy based on the level of 
spectrum decentralization in the mobile market.  
First of all, we have started our analysis by handling spectrum-HHI parameter. Spectrum-HHI describes the 
spectrum concentration between the market players in a straightforward way. Lungborg et al. has 
explained that spectrum holdings in different frequency bands constitute considerable differences. Thereof, 
the total amount of spectrum of each player is not adequate to present neither the competitive advantage 
of each player nor the spectrum policy in the market.  
Theoretically, reselling rights sustain efficiency on the spectrum allocation over time by allowing spectrum 
trading in a dynamic and liberal way. Therefore, mobile operators get the opportunity to optimize their 
spectrum holdings by maximizing the synergy between the frequency bands. Australia and New Zealand 
have emerged as pioneer markets by defining the spectrum reselling rights long ago. Even though, the 
reselling rights have enabled spectrum transactions in these markets, still Australian market possesses the 
most concentrated spectrum band among the case markets in this study (spectrum-HHI value for Australia 
is 3806). In New Zealand case, spectrum-HHI value points 2558 which is higher than United States, Sweden, 
India and Chile. Hence, at the moment we may argue that the reselling rights have no clear effects on 
spectrum decentralization. Due to this fact, we are excluding the reselling rights from spectrum policy 
analysis. Nevertheless, we assess this parameter as it may potentially affect the spectrum decentralization 
at a time when the secondary spectrum trading markets rollout in the rest of the mobile markets. 
Technology harmonization and neutrality regulations vary from market to market. In these regards, we 
have put the studied mobile markets into three categories: technology-neutral mobile markets, technology-
harmonized mobile markets and the markets where the technology harmonized by the market forces. As 
mobile technologies may have different spectrum requirements; the composition of the spectrum holding 
as well as technology harmonization and neutrality framework become crucial. As the selection of 
technological standard determines the basics of the services which can be provided over the network, 
these services influence the market share of the mobile operators. 
Spectrum holdings and overall spectrum concentration in the market constitutes for mobile operators a 
base to provide services to the subscribers. Lungborg et al. stated that spectrum allocation have a clear 
effect on competitiveness of the mobile operators. Surely, market share is a key parameter to present the 
competitiveness of the mobile operators. Market share composition among the players is well-explained 
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with market-HHI parameter. Thus, in this study we have determined market-HHI as the explaining factor for 
spectrum policy in the studied mobile markets.  
In Figure 5.1 spectrum-HHI versus market-HHI has been drawn. Even though, the relations between the 
parameters are visible in the figure, the level of correlation between these parameters is not very strong. 
Therefore, we argue that the level of correlation is influenced by technology neutrality and harmonization 
framework as well as the qualitative decisions regarding the spectrum regulation.  
 
Figure 5.1. Spectrum-HHI versus market-HHI in the studied mobile markets. 
 
In the market structure analysis, we have analyzed mobile market parameters including  investments per 
subscribers, mobile prices, ARPU, churn rate, industry unbundling, prepaid subscription ratio. This analysis 
have aimed to assess the level of vertical integration via regression analysis and theoretical academic 
background to discover the correlation between the parameters.    
First of all, prepaid subscriptions have great affect on mobile market structure. Owzarczuk et. al. has 
presented that prepaid subscriptions increase the churn rate  figures. As prepaid subscriptions 
characterized with lower loyalty, commitment and switching costs along with no binding contracts, the 
churn rate becomes boosted. Besides, Kokko has stated that the prepaid subscriptions have more churn 
rate and lower ARPU values. During regression analysis we have confirmed the correlation of prepaid ratio 
with churn rate and ARPU (figure 5.2 and  figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.2. Prepaid ratio versus monthly churn rate in the studied mobile markets.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Prepaid ratio versus mobile ARPU in the studied mobile markets.  
As one of the key objective for the mobile operators try to sustain profitability, mobile operators should 
correlate their revenues with their investments. In this regards, mobile ARPU should be proportional with 
the investments per subscribers. Regression analysis on mobile ARPU versus investments per subscriber has 
proved a clear correlation. (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4. Mobile ARPU versus investments per subscriber in the studied mobile markets. 
As y-axis in the phase diagram for mobile telecom regulations represents the level of vertical integration, 
the studies by Howell and Davies constitute background for our analysis. Davies et. al. has explained that 
the crucial objective of the regulator in the industry unbundling roadmap aims improving the price of 
services relative to quality. In this manner, industry unbundling roadmap facilitates price competition in the 
mobile market resulting the reduction of the price level. In contrast, if the industry is vertically integrated, 
regulator may improve price/quality ratio by mandating investments in the infrastructure. In this way, the 
quality of the product portfolio in the market enhanced relative to the prices.  Furthermore, Howell has 
stated that industry unbundling enables competition in the retail side which reduces the prices in the short 
term. Nevertheless the reduction in the prices decreases the level of the investment by mobile operators. 
Thus, in the long term price/quality ratio becomes worsened. Based on these studies, we may say that 
prices define the present situation in vertical integration where investments per subscribers define the 
direction of the industry in the future regarding the vertical integration. Low mobile prices exhibits open 
mobile market structure along with high level of investments signal the more closed mobile market. Thus, 
both mobile prices and investments per subscriber constitute the explaining factor for mobile market 
structure.   
Based on our analysis on mobile market parameters, we have formulated the explaining factors for 
spectrum policy and mobile market structure as Equation 5.1 and 5.2.  
Spectrum policy explaining factor = (1 /HHI)                                       (Equation 5.1) 
Market structure explaining factor = (1/ (Mobile prices. Investments per subscriber)            (Equation 5.2) 
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Mobile markets Spectrum policy factor Market structure factor 
Finland 2,9800 0,8600 
Chile 2,7700 0,0700 
Sweden 3,3800 0,4700 
Turkey 2,6000 0,1500 
UK 3,8300 0,1300 
China 2,0190 0,3300 
India 7,3529 1,6600 
New Zealand 2,5753 0,0500 
Australia 2,8457 0,0200 
USA 3,9370 0,0800 
Japan 2,7340 0,0100 
Table 5.1. Spectrum policy and market structure factors in the studied mobile markets. 
 
Firstly we have created Table 5.1 which includes the values of explaining factors in the studied mobile 
markets. Then, we have configured the phase diagram for mobile telecom regulations as following figure 
5.5. As a difference from the previous version, we have arranged the y-axis in logarithmic scale to observe 
the market structure factor values sharply.  
Based on the phase diagram, the most decentralized mobile market is clearly India. Existence of high 
number of  mobile players makes  Indian market as the most fragmented mobile market in this study. All 
the Western style mobile markets are concentrated at a small field in the phase diagram  where U.S. and 
UK are a little distinct in a decentralized spectrum manner. Not surprisingly, China is the most centralized 
mobile market as all the market players are state-owned and the lack of pure competition for long. 
Regarding the market structure, India is observed as the most open mobile market where Japan is as the 
most closed mobile market. High churn rate, low level of mobile prices and investment puts the Indian 
market in an open market structure. In contrast, low churn rate, high level prices and investments exhibit 
the closed structure of Japanese mobile market. As European Union mandated vertical disintegration of 
access and core networks for all member states, still there are variances in the level of openness in member 
states. In this regards, Finland and Sweden have more open mobile market structure than UK. However, all 
of the European markets in this study have more open market structure than U.S. where the vertical 
disintegration is not forced by the regulator. 
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Figure 5.5. Phase diagram for mobile telecom regulations.  
 
5.2 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
In this research study, we have systematically analyzed mobile markets in respect to spectrum policy and 
market structure. In this manner, we have investigated parameters which demonstrate regulators´ 
spectrum policy and up-to-date status of the mobile market structure. We have performed parameter 
analysis by correlation analysis and relevant academic literature. This investigation has leaded us to 
discover explaining factors which present the insight of mobile market structure in a straightforward way.  
In spectrum policy point of view, we have analyzed market share composition and relevant HHI, spectrum 
share between players, status of reselling rights, technology and service neutrality framework. The analysis 
has shown that spectrum distribution along with qualitative regulatory decisions clearly related to 
competitiveness and thus market share of the mobile operators. Respect to these relations, we have 
determined the HHI index as the explaining factor in spectrum policy. 
Assessing the market structure regarding to level of vertical integration, we have dealt with plenty of 
mobile market parameters: investments per subscribers, mobile prices, ARPU, churn rate, industry 
unbundling, prepaid subscription ratio. Crucial objective in industry unbundling framework is improving 
price/quality ratio. In vertically disintegrated market structure, the ratio has been improved by retail side 
price competition. In contrast, in vertically integrated mobile markets the ratio is improved by the 
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mandated high level of investments. Based on these characteristics, we have determined both mobile 
prices and investment per subscriber as mobile structure explaining factor.  
Based on these explaining factors, we have assessed the spectrum policy and market structure in the 
studied mobile markets via phase diagram for mobile telecom regulation. Our research has shown that 
India has clearly the most decentralized spectrum along with the most vertically disintegrated market. After 
India, American market has the second most decentralized spectrum even though American market is more 
integrated than Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom. As Japanese market has high switching cost, Japan 
has the most vertically integrated mobile market in this study. European Union regulates the mobile 
markets based on unbundling framework. Parallel to this framework; Finnish, Swedish and British markets 
have more open structure relative to American mobile market.  
As further research, we believe that enhancing the data set which reflects mobile market characteristics, 
may raise the differences between the mobile markets even sharper. Based on that, explaining factors may 
be developed even further. Moreover, enhancing number of the mobile markets can rise scope of the 
research.   
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APPENDIXES  
A. Telecommunications Related Rankings in Studied Mobile Markets 
Mobile Market  Network Readiness Index 
Finland 5.4 (rank #3) 
Chile 4.3 (rank #39) 
Turkey 3.8 (rank #71) 
United Kingdom 5.1 (rank #15) 
Australia 5.1 (rank #17) 
New Zealand 5.0 (rank #18) 
China 4.1 (rank #51) 
India 3.9 (rank #69) 
United States 5.6 (rank #8) 
Japan 5.3 (rank #18) 
Sweden 5.9 (rank #1) 
 
 
Mobile Market  Laws relating to ICT 
Finland 5.5 (rank #7) 
Chile 5.0 (rank #29) 
Turkey 4.3 (rank #49) 
United Kingdom 5.4 (rank #16) 
Australia 5.5 (rank #11) 
New Zealand 5.5 (rank #8) 
China 4.4 (rank #47) 
India 4.4 (rank #48) 
United States 5.3 (rank #17) 
Japan 4.7 (rank #36) 
Sweden 5.9 (rank #1) 
 
 
Mobile Market  Intellectual property protection 
Finland 6.2 (rank #2) 
Chile 3.7 (rank #58) 
Turkey 2.6 (rank #116) 
United Kingdom 5.5 (rank #17) 
Australia 5.6 (rank #14) 
New Zealand 5.8 (rank #7) 
China 4.0 (rank #47) 
India 3.5 (rank #68) 
United States 5.0 (rank #28) 
Japan 5.3 (rank #22) 
Sweden 6.0 (rank #4) 
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Mobile Market  Internet and telephony competition ranking 
Finland rank #1 
Chile rank #1 
Turkey rank #62 
United Kingdom rank #1 
Australia rank #1 
New Zealand rank #1 
China rank #92 
India rank #60 
United States rank #1 
Japan rank #1 
Sweden rank #1 
 
 
 
Mobile Market  Mobile network  coverage 
Finland 99.5% (rank #43) 
Chile 100% (rank #1) 
Turkey 100 (rank #1) 
United Kingdom 99.8 (rank #33) 
Australia 99.0 (rank #48) 
New Zealand 97 (rank #69) 
China 99.5 (rank #46) 
India 83.0 (rank #111) 
United States 99.8 (rank #37) 
Japan 99.8 (rank #25) 
Sweden 99.0 (rank #49) 
 
 
 
Mobile Market  Impact of ICT on access to basic services 
Finland 5.3 (rank #25) 
Chile 5.0 (rank #33) 
Turkey 4.7 (rank #55) 
United Kingdom 4.9 (rank #39) 
Australia 5.0 (rank #34) 
New Zealand 5.3 (rank #33) 
China 5.3 (rank #31) 
India 4.4 (rank #69) 
United States 5.3 (rank #29) 
Japan 4.9 (rank #42) 
Sweden 6.3 (rank #1) 
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Mobile Market  Government success in ICT promotion 
Finland 5.2 (rank #23) 
Chile 4.5 (rank #55) 
Turkey 4.0 (rank  #87) 
United Kingdom 4.5 (rank #50) 
Australia 4.9 (rank #32) 
New Zealand 5.4 (rank #27) 
China 5.6 (rank #18) 
India 5.1 (rank #42) 
United States 5.3 (rank #31) 
Japan 5.1 (rank #44) 
Sweden 6.1 (rank #2) 
 
 
 
Mobile Market  Firm level technology absorption 
Finland 6.0 (rank #12) 
Chile 5.3 (rank #37) 
Turkey 5.1 (rank #51) 
United Kingdom 5.7 (rank #21) 
Australia 5.9 (rank #19) 
New Zealand 5.9 (rank #17) 
China 4.9 (rank #61) 
India 5.3 (rank #41) 
United States 5.9 (rank #18) 
Japan 5.9 (rank #19) 
Sweden 6.5 (rank #1) 
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B. Mobile Spectrum Distribution Between Mobile Players in the Studied Countries 
 
 
B.1 Chile  
 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
Entel 60 23% 
Telefonica  55 21% 
Claro 55 21% 
VTR 30 11% 
Nextel 60 23% 
Total Assigned 260  
 
 
B.2 Finland 
 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
Sonera 133,3 33,3% 
Elisa 133,3 33,3% 
DNA 133,3 33,3% 
Total Assigned 400 MHz  
 
 
B.3 Turkey 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
Turkcell 62 33,3% 
Vodafone 57 31% 
Avea 66,8 36% 
Total Assigned 185,8 MHz  
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B.4 Sweden 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
Sonera 126 24% 
Hi3G 145 27% 
Net4Mob 112 22% 
Tele2 24 5% 
Telenor 61 12% 
Spring Mobile 6 1% 
SvenskaUMTS 45 9% 
Total Assigned 519 MHz  
 
 
B.5 China* 
 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
China Mobile  35 36% 
Telecom 30 32% 
Unicom 30 32% 
Total Assigned 95  
* Only 3G spectrum band is included. 
 
 
B.6  United Kingdom 
 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
Telefonica 69,8 26% 
Vodafone 74,6 27% 
Ev&Ev 100 36% 
3G 29,8 11% 
Total Assigned 274,2  
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B.7 New Zealand 
 
MNOs Spectrum Band 
(MHz) 
Share % 
Telecom 150 22% 
2degrees 100 15% 
Vodafone 275 40% 
Kordia 100 15% 
CallPlus 55 8% 
Total Assigned 680   
 
 
B.8 Japan 
MNOs Spectrum Band (MHz) Share % 
DocoMo 160 33% 
KDDI 140  28% 
Sofbank 134  27% 
eAccess 50 10% 
Total Assigned 484  
 
              B.9 Australia 
Melbourne 
Mobile Operator Bandwidth (MHz) Percentage (%) 
Telstra 100 32 
Vodafone 150 48 
Optus 60 19 
HHI value for Melbourne 3689 
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Sydney 
Mobile Operator Bandwidth (MHz) Percentage (%) 
Telstra 100 31 
Vodafone 165 51 
Optus 60 19 
HHI value for Sydney 3923 
 
C. Population and Mobile Subscription Ratio in the Studied Countries 
 
Countries Population 
Finland 5.4 million 
Chile 16.5 million 
Sweden 9.5 million 
Turkey 75 million 
United Kingdom 63 million 
China 1 354 million 
India 1 210 million 
New Zealand 4.4 million 
Australia 22.9 million 
United States 315 million 
Japan  127 million 
 
 
Countries Subscription ratio Date of the data 
Finland 171 2011 
Chile 130 2012 
Sweden 146 2011 
Turkey 89 2011 
United Kingdom 123 2011 
China 81,2 2012 
India 73,1 2012 
New Zealand 109 2012 
Australia 108 2012 
United States 103,3 2012 
Japan  103 2012 
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D. Implementation Date of Mobile Number Portability 
Countries Implementation Date of MNP  
Finland 2003 
Chile 2012  
Sweden 2001 
Turkey 2008 
United Kingdom 1999 
China Not Available 
India 2011 
New Zealand 2007 
Australia 2001 
United States 2003 
Japan  2006 
 
